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INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES: THE CASE OF THE 2016 
US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
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A version of this paper has appeared in I. Cardinale and R. Scazzieri (Eds.), The Palgrave 
Handbook of Political Economy, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018 
 
1. Introduction 
In early 2015, two scholars sat down to analyze the just completed 2014 Congressional 
elections. In contrast to mainstream commentators, they were not chiefly intrigued by the 
Republican gains in Congress or the widespread dissatisfaction with President Obama’s 
economic policies that almost everyone agreed had helped cause that disaster for the president’s 
party.1 Instead, after pouring over state by state election returns, they drew a radically different 
lesson:  the American political system was coming apart at its seams. 
The scholars knew that voter turnout typically falls off in mid-term elections. But the 
extent of the decline in 2014 astonished them. The major parties appeared to be breaking down 
as mass organizing vehicles:  
2014 was fundamentally a democratic debacle. It likely heralds a new stage in the 
disintegration of the American political order….Focus on changes in turnout 
between presidential elections and the next off-year election. Across the whole 
sweep of American history, the momentous dimensions of what has just happened 
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stand out in bold relief. The drop off in voting turnout from the presidential 
election of 2012 to 2014 is the second largest of all time –24 percentage 
points…the decline is broad and to levels that boggle the mind – rates of voting 
that recall the earliest days of the 19th century, before the Jacksonian Revolution 
swept away property suffrage and other devices that held down turnout. Turnout 
in Ohio, for example, fell to 34 percent – a level the state last touched in 1814, 
when political parties on a modern model did not exist and it had just recently 
entered the Union. New York trumped even this: turnout in the Empire State 
plunged to 30 percent, almost back to where it was in 1798, when property 
suffrage laws disenfranchised some 40 percent of the citizenry. New Jersey 
managed a little better: turnout fell to 31 percent, back to levels of the 1820s. 
Delaware turnout fell to 35 percent, well below some elections of the 1790s. In 
the west, by contrast, turnout declined to levels almost without precedent: 
California’s 33 percent turnout appears to be the lowest recorded since the state 
entered the union in 1850. Nevada also hit a record low (28 percent), as did Utah 
at 26 percent (for elections to the House) (Burnham and Ferguson, 2014). 
If there was any good news, it was decidedly bitter sweet: “[T]he sharp plunge in turnout 
elsewhere helped achieve a milestone of sorts: regional differences between the South and the 
rest of country just about vanished, for the first time since perhaps 1872, when the Union army 
still occupied much of the old Confederacy.” 
The Republicans seemed ascendant; they had just won back control of the Senate. But the 
analysts believed that the vacuum forming at the heart of the party system spelled big trouble for 
both major political parties: “though Republicans jubilate now, the trend is probably as 
threatening to them as it is to the Democrats. The reason is stark: Increasing numbers of average 
Americans can no longer stomach voting for parties that only pretend to represent their 
interests.”  
With an eye on Hillary Clinton’s looming presidential candidacy, the scholars laid down 
a very specific caution, derived from their assessment of the Obama administration’s economic 
record and the Party’s top-heavy dependence on super rich megadonors. 
Though some Democrats try to sugarcoat the dismal facts by focusing on changes 
since 2009, when the President assumed office, the truth is that the fruits of the 
recovery have gone lopsidedly to the very richest Americans. Wall Street and the 
stock market boom, but wages continue to stagnate, and unemployment remains 
stubbornly high…The administration’s continuing efforts to court Wall Street, 
along with its reluctance to sanction even flagrant misconduct by prominent 
financiers just pour salt into these wounds….2014 suggests that the Democrats’ 
ability to retain any mass constituency at all may now be in question. The facts of 
globalization, top-heavy income inequality, and the worldwide tendency toward 
austerity may just be too much for a party that is essentially dominated by 
segments of the 1 percent but whose legacy appeal is to average 
Americans…Right now Hillary Clinton’s strategists appear to be pinning their 
hopes on firing up another ritualized big money-led coalition of minorities and 
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particular groups instead of making broad economic appeals. That hope might 
perhaps prove out, if the slow and very modest economic recovery continues into 
2016, or the Republicans nominate another Richie Rich caricature like Mitt 
Romney, who openly mocks the poorest 47% of the electorate. But exit surveys 
showed that in 2014 many women voters thought economic recovery and jobs 
were top issues, too (Burnham and Ferguson, 2014).  
2. The Trump Puzzle 
 In 2016 the Republicans nominated yet another super-rich candidate – indeed, 
someone on the Forbes 400 list of wealthiest Americans. But pigeonholing him as a 
Romney-like Richie Rich was not easy. Like legions of conservative Republicans before 
him, he trash talked Hispanics, immigrants, and women virtually non-stop, though with a 
verve uniquely his own. He laced his campaign with barely coded racial appeals and in 
the final days, ran an ad widely denounced as subtly anti-Semitic.2 But he supplemented 
these with other messages that qualified as true blockbusters: In striking contrast to every 
other Republican presidential nominee since 1936, he attacked globalization, free trade, 
international financiers, Wall Street, and even Goldman Sachs.  
 “Globalization has made the financial elite who donate to politicians very wealthy. 
But it has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache. 
When subsidized foreign steel is dumped into our markets, threatening our 
factories, the politicians do nothing. For years, they watched on the sidelines as our 
jobs vanished and our communities were plunged into depression-level 
unemployment.”3 
In a frontal assault on the American establishment, the Republican standard bearer 
proclaimed “America First.” Mocking the Bush administration’s appeal to “weapons of 
mass destruction” as a pretext for invading Iraq, he broke dramatically with two 
generations of GOP orthodoxy and spoke out in favor of more cooperation with Russia. 
He even criticized the “carried interest” tax break beloved by high finance. His 
campaign’s outreach to blue collar workers was so effective that it provoked Hillary 
Clinton into a gaffe about “deplorables” remarkably similar to Mitt Romney’s famous 
outburst four years earlier.4  
In the end, Donald Trump accomplished perhaps the greatest upset in American 
political history. With essentially all experts agreeing that he was politically dead, and 
many Republicans turning their backs on his campaign, he won more than half of all 
voters with a high school education or less (including 61% of white women with no 
college), almost two thirds of those who believed life for the next generation of 
Americans would be worse than now, and seventy-seven percent of voters who reported 
their personal financial situation had worsened since four years ago.5 As the stock market 
rocketed upward the next morning instead of tanking as virtually all talking heads in the 
media had predicted if Trump somehow prevailed, elites and many ordinary citizens 
around the world felt the ground slipping beneath their feet.  On the heels of the United 
Kingdom’s stunning vote in June to exit the European Union, which triggered another 
surprise short run economic upturn, it was all too much: some new and uncanny force 
seemed loose in the world.  
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Given the new regime’s stunning, at times almost hallucinatory, whirl of 
personnel switches, out of right field cabinet appointments, Oval Office tweets over the 
head of establishment media, loudly advertised breaks with precedent, and dramatic 
policy reversals, both real and claimed, the two scholars’ conclusion that “the American 
political universe is being rapidly reshaped by economic and cultural crisis into 
something distinctly different” now seems almost trite (Burnham and Ferguson, 2014). 
But even a casual reading of the world press and the international scholarly discussion 
reveals an enormous divergence of views about the roots of this transformation as well as 
what actually happened in the 2016 election (Crotty, 2017). 
Some of the perplexity arises from what at times amounts to a multiple 
personality disorder afflicting the new administration.  A few incidents in the campaign 
foreshadowed this, but the syndrome became obtrusive as the new leader grasped the 
reins of power.  Even in normal times, political coalitions in America are messy around 
their edges, because they are built up out of elements that rarely cohere completely. But 
we are not in normal times. The Trump campaign was born in singularity: a billionaire 
candidate whose fundamental economic strategy as he emerged from a succession of 
hairbreadth escapes from insolvency rested on transforming himself into a worldwide 
brand name and then franchising that, thus avoiding big capital commitments. In the 
crunch, however, as we will show, name recognition could not substitute for real money: 
first as he accepted the Republican nomination and then again in the late summer of 
2016, his solo campaign had to be rescued by major industries plainly hoping for tariff 
relief, waves of other billionaires from the far, far right of the already far right 
Republican Party, and the most disruption-exalting corners of Wall Street.  
 The end of all vestiges of a one-man campaign had fateful consequences. The 
diverse investor blocs ranging themselves behind the new regime swelled but did not 
unify. Their only real point of agreement was that they preferred Trump to Hillary 
Clinton. After the election, the soaring stock market and influx of free market crusaders, 
including many former lobbyists, plumping for lower taxes, deregulation, and smaller 
government (aside, of course, from military expenditure) did win more admirers for the 
administration – for a time.  An increasingly receptive business community, for example, 
showered record breaking amounts of cash on the inauguration festivities.  
Yet even as financiers from the very same Goldman Sachs firm that Trump had so 
recently denounced flocked to senior White House slots, Trump himself continued to 
cling to notions of mobilizing blue collar workers. He put Steve Bannon, who 
championed this idea, in the White House and even, for a while, on the National Security 
Council. The incoming President electrified millions of Americans with tweets critical of 
Boeing, General Motors, and other giant businesses.  He also organized meetings with 
union leaders. Spurning Democratic leaders’ calls for all-out “Resistance,” many trade 
union heads in construction, the electrical industry, and sectors of manufacturing hurt by 
free trade responded enthusiastically. Other more suspicious union chiefs felt boxed in by 
Trump’s obvious popularity within their ranks. Democrats and even many Republicans 
feared that his much talked about pledges to boost infrastructure spending might become 
the basis of a new political realignment in which traditional Democratic constituencies 
played key roles.6 
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The ghost of Juan Peron, however, vanished almost as fast as it appeared. Forced 
to make a choice, the President opted to nominate a fast food executive with a notoriously 
anti-union record as the next Secretary of Labor. The nominee gushed enthusiastically 
about rolling back the Obama administration’s rules – which, in contrast to so much else 
it did in the field of economic regulation,  represented real, effective measures to protect 
low wage workers against wage theft and violations of minimum wage laws. The 
resulting scrutiny led to a pitched battle and an embarrassing withdrawal by the nominee. 
His replacement was less controversial, but the credibility of any courtship of labor was 
in tatters (Block, 2017). 
Similar zig-zags marked many other areas of policy, as internationally oriented 
business groups battled the champions of economic nationalism. The President 
repudiated the Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement and another accord under negotiation with 
Europe, but he moved slowly on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
He also took his time implementing proposals for tariffs, though every small step he and 
his advisors took in that direction sent shockwaves around the world. The same slow 
motion shuffle befell his campaign’s signature proposal for a wall on the Mexican border: 
there was talk, but little action. On NATO, policy toward the Middle East, Russian, Iran, 
and US alliances with Pacific area countries such as Japan and Korea, the administration 
was plainly at war with itself, to the consternation of many U.S. allies, who were 
dismayed to discover that whatever “America First” meant, the taxi meter was running 
and they would have to ante up more for defense. As Steve Bannon exited the White 
House, amid a storm of controversy in the wake of the Charlottesville street clashes, the 
President reversed his own long held personal views, accepted the advice of his 
internationalist advisers, and decided to stay in Afghanistan. 
 More fatefully, the administration’s initial efforts to block immigration by 
executive order were rejected by the courts and roused widespread indignation.  They 
disgusted many Americans, who were repelled by what they perceived as arrant prejudice 
and barely disguised racism. Executives from many high tech companies, long reliant on 
steady streams of inexpensive foreign engineers, protested, as did other prominent 
business figures.   
The administration slid deeper into trouble when it caved in to pressure to make 
repealing the Obama administration’s Affordable Care Act its first priority instead of 
swiftly passing legislation on infrastructure or broader tax reform. That opened enormous 
fissures between insurers and hospitals on one side and the Koch-led conservatives whose 
priority was lower taxes, and who had heavily bankrolled Congressional Republicans. It 
also directly threatened vast numbers of voters, whose lives sometimes literally depended 
on the program. When the Senate refused to go along, the whole effort collapsed abjectly.  
The President quarreled in public with Republican Congressional leaders. He 
shocked even some of them when he insisted that all the contending protest groups in 
Charlottesville occupied the same moral level. After he pardoned a former Arizona 
sheriff who had boasted about his harsh treatment of immigrants, an eerie chill set in 
between the President, Capitol Hill Republicans, and even some members of the Cabinet 
and White House staff. Then, all of a sudden, the President started talking to Democratic 
leaders about a deficit deal, to the astonishment of everyone concerned.  But that, too, 
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turned out to be a mirage, as the administration quickly turned to Republican-only tax 
“reform” aimed at helping corporations and the wealthy. 
 
3. Election Shapers? Comey and the Russians 
A record of campaigning and governing as crazy quilted as Trump’s guarantees 
that reasonable people will assess some facts differently.  But virtually from the moment 
Trump squeaked through on election night, all discussion turned highly partisan.7 Hillary 
Clinton and other leading Democrats called for all out “Resistance” amid waves of grass 
roots protests to the new regime. As they sounded the tocsin, they pressed two explosive 
theories of her narrow loss alongside their criticism of the media’s preoccupation with 
her emails. The first traced it to Russian hacking efforts that led to the publication (by 
WikiLeaks) in the run up to the Democratic Convention of embarrassing Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) emails and later, in October, emails from top Clinton adviser 
John Podesta and the Center for American Progress that he had founded.8  
The second pinned the reversal on the October 28th announcement – just days 
before the election – by then Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey that 
the Bureau was reopening its earlier investigation into Clinton’s use of a private email 
server while Secretary of State. Although Comey subsequently informed Congressional 
leaders that his original decision not to prosecute would stand, Clinton and many other 
analysts contend that the announcement fatally damaged her credibility (Clinton, 2017).  
Discussions of possible Russian attempts to influence the election had figured in a 
few news reports media since the late spring of 2016. But within weeks after the election 
both the Comey and the Russian stories were swept up into a much bigger and far more 
ideologically charged narrative that soon resounded around the world. The allegations 
about Russian influence dramatically broadened. A wave of leaks from unnamed national 
security personnel suggested that key people in Trump’s entourage, including incoming 
National Security Adviser Daniel Flynn, a former Army Lieutenant General whom 
President Obama had fired as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, had improperly 
cooperated with the Kremlin, possibly even violating the law. Stories also appeared 
relating how Republican Congressional leaders had resisted efforts by senior Obama 
administration officials to publicize allegations about the ties to Russia before the 
election.9   
In early January the Office of the (outgoing) Director of National Intelligence 
released a declassified version of a secret evaluation drafted and coordinated by the FBI, 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA). Its title 
page bore the legend “ICA Intelligence Community Assessment.”10 At the time, the 
document was widely heralded as representing the unanimous view of the entire 
American intelligence establishment. But this was not true. The report was in fact the 
product of a specially assembled team of analysts from the three agencies whose work 
was not circulated to the rest of the intelligence community.11 Almost a third of the 
document concentrated on broad brush criticism of “Russian TV,” whose audience in the 
US is minuscule. The NSA, which controls the equipment used for electronic 
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eavesdropping and thus should enjoy a uniquely authoritative position, was less confident 
than the CIA and the FBI, but agreed with the report’s conclusion that a Russian 
campaign “aspired to help President elect Trump’s chances of victory.”12 
 The new conclusion represented a quantum escalation in claims; as late as 
October 31, “F.B.I. and intelligence officials” maintained that the DNC hacking “was 
aimed at disrupting the presidential election rather than electing Mr. Trump” (Lichtblau 
and Meyers, 2016). 
Ever more extraordinary revelations cascaded on top of one another. New leaks 
revealed that the copy of the report given to the President contained a two-page summary 
of sensational claims about links between the Russian government and Trump that the 
intelligence chiefs admitted they could not verify. A “dossier” said to have been compiled 
by a former British intelligence agent who was a key source for many of those allegations 
quickly appeared in the press, touching off a worldwide firestorm. Not for many months 
did it become clear that the dossier actually had grown out of a research project originally 
commissioned by Republican opponents of Trump in the primaries; this was at first 
financed by a news site supported by Paul Singer, a prominent Wall Street financier, 
before being taken over by lawyers representing the Clinton campaign and the 
Democratic National Committee (Vogel and Haberman, 2017).  Other claims said to 
derive from other European intelligence services were added to the mix, along with 
reports that DNC personnel had sought derogatory information on Trump from sources in 
Ukraine.13 
Several Congressional committees and at least one federal grand jury are 
currently investigating these matters. We see no reason to try to anticipate their 
conclusions, though the revelation that the Clinton campaign and the Democratic 
National Committee payed for part of the dossier must inevitably raise many new 
questions (Entous et al., 2017a). For this paper, only a few key points require notice. 
Firstly, that great powers mix in politics and elections in other countries should not be 
news. Both the US and many other countries have plainly done this many times – one 
thinks, for example of the now well documented US interventions in Italy, France and 
other countries in the early days of the Cold War. This sort of thing is now virtually 
institutionalized among the major powers. Indeed, several of the social media companies 
which played major roles in the Republican campaign are known to have sought and 
sometimes obtained contracts from the US or UK to work on elections or public opinion 
abroad, while many pollsters affiliated with the Democrats also work around the world, 
in the past including even elections in Russia.14 Many, though not all, such operations 
garner support from various government agencies, sometimes backstage but often quite in 
the open.15 
Secondly, the use of internet and social media to reach across borders was 
virtually inevitable as soon as the technology developed to do it. The utility of these new 
forms of communication to bypass establishment media in the United States and some 
other countries (such as Italy and the UK) is now well documented, if variously assessed. 
That technology mostly developed alongside the rise of giant “platform” companies, such 
as Google and Facebook; it is mostly Made in America and centered heavily in Silicon 
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Valley, though other countries, including Russia and China, certainly have also built up 
formidable capabilities. This is a point we shall return to below. 
We note that some language of the original NSA, FBI, and CIA report is 
intriguingly guarded. It alludes to a campaign that “aspired” to help the Trump campaign 
to victory.16 That language brings to mind Robert Browning’s famous line about the 
difference between a man’s reach and his grasp. Whatever hopes Vladimir Putin or any 
oligarch may have entertained, the Russians had no special insight not reflected in 
American polls or betting markets (which are now widely accepted as good guideposts to 
conventional wisdom about election probabilities).17 Trump’s win came as a worldwide 
shock; on Election Day his own polls showed him a likely loser, as did betting markets 
(Green, 2017). Like everywhere else, television networks in Russia had been preparing 
audiences for a Clinton victory.18 Whatever Flynn, Jared Kushner, or anyone else said to 
Russian officials before or after the election, any outside power meddling in the election 
could at best only have been picking up an option on defeating Clinton that was 
monumentally out of the money.  
Throughout the campaign Trump consistently trailed Hillary Clinton in the polls, 
usually by substantial margins. In Paul Manafort’s brief stint as Trump’s campaign 
manager, save for the usual momentary bounce after the Republican Convention, the 
campaign’s fortunes went from bad to worse, admittedly often for reasons that could 
hardly be laid at Manafort’s door. When Steve Bannon, Kellyanne Conway, and the bloc 
of celebrated far right investors we discuss below jumped in to salvage things in mid-
August, 2016, the campaign looked doomed. The most likely outcome any outside force 
could reasonably expect at that time was to embarrass (and seriously rile up) the 
prohibitive favorite, Hillary Clinton.  
The dueling narratives about Putin and Comey, however, require some comments. 
First of all they do not cohere very well. Indeed, they come close to contradicting each 
other. There is plenty of material on the record, for example, to show that Comey knew 
of the misgivings of the other intelligence agencies when he dropped his October 28th 
bombshell. But the Director of the FBI was certainly not in league with Vladimir Putin. 
We look forward to the investigating committees’ explanations of why he breached the 
long-standing protocol that the FBI did not comment on investigations as elections 
approach, while declining to publicize the developing investigation into ties between the 
Trump campaign and Russia. We are equally curious about the many reports of 
dissension within the FBI and agents’ complaints to senior Republican politicians 
advising Trump. These are especially troubling given John Podesta’s public suggestion 
that elements within the Bureau may have hoped to elect Trump and Rudolph Giuliani’s 
suggestive remarks on several occasions.19 The inquiry also needs to consider the broader 
process of politicization at work within the US intelligence community, since – most 
unusually – former agency heads issued clashing public endorsements of the major party 
candidates.   
We think, however, that the evidence that either Comey or the Russians (or both) 
clearly cost Clinton the election is less clear-cut than often asserted.  Moreover, no matter 
how one assesses these possibilities, focusing excessively on them misses the most 
important questions about the election. 
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 All versions of the Russian story, for example, seem inconclusive, though one – 
the claims about internet trolling – is extremely difficult to assess, since virtually all data 
has been withheld from the public and leaked selectively by obviously interested parties. 
Let us set aside all arguments about the hackings themselves and focus first on the effects 
of the major email leaks. In March, Wikileaks had put on line a searchable file of Hillary 
Clinton’s emails from her private email server while serving as Secretary of State. Those 
had been obtained via Freedom of Information requests. Later Julian Assange had 
trumpeted a forthcoming series of revelations regarding Clinton. Stories had also 
appeared about Russian efforts to penetrate Democratic National Committee emails. 
Some emails leaked into the press in mid-June; a source claiming to be “Guccifer 2.0” 
claimed credit, though another mysterious website, DC Leaks, also began posting 
documents.20 But the main drops came a month later. WikiLeaks began unveiling DNC 
emails in large numbers on July 22nd, just after the Republican Convention and 
immediately ahead of the Democratic conclave. Trump’s modest post-convention bounce 
quickly melted away and Clinton kept going up in the polls for weeks. Her ascent was so 
marked that many observers, including, eventually, Donald Trump, concluded that unless 
his campaign drastically changed course, the election was all but over. That her ascension 
may have owed more to Trump’s own bizarre campaign tactics than anything she did is 
irrelevant. The point is, she rose. By the time October rolled around, the earlier wave of 
emails was very old news for most voters. They cannot have turned the tide in favor of 
Trump.  
By contrast, the release of the bulk of the Podesta emails at least comes closer to 
the moment Clinton flamed out. They were let go on a rolling basis starting on October 
7th. But several major stumbling blocks stand in the way of the notion that they played a 
major role in turning the election around.  
Older voting research typically argued that most voters making up their minds at 
the last minute came from the ranks of those paying the least attention to news and 
campaigns and with little interest in politics. This view is now increasingly contested, but 
more late deciders than not appear to resemble the older stereotype (Brox and Giammo, 
2009). This makes strong claims somewhat problematic right off the bat. There is a real 
question about the sheer news value the story had for most Americans. For sure, within 
the Beltway and the Clinton campaign, the messages and doings of John Podesta and his 
lobbyist brother, along with the unvarnished opinions of Clinton’s campaign managers 
about their candidate, ranked as a towering story. But outside of Washington, D.C., it is 
not obvious that that these details engrossed many voters, particularly in the battleground 
states.  
Possibly any controversy that mentioned emails made problems for Clinton, but 
the point about attention is still material. The day the story broke, the competition for 
attention was ferocious: the infamous audio hit the airwaves in which Trump boasted 
about vulgar tactics he used to approach some women who interested him. The firestorm 
that triggered went on for days; indeed, in some sense, it has not died down to this day. 
We think it is likely that Trump’s remarks on that subject intrigued far more voters than 
either the emails or a fresh claim about the Kremlin favoring Trump that also cracked the 
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news that day. Most voters probably had never heard of either Podesta brother and likely 
cannot recognize them even today.  
This claim is testable, albeit quite imperfectly, along with the closely related 
contention of some commentators that the destructive force of the stories derives from 
their cumulative effects over the month. Google Trends allows one to compare the 
relative volume of searches on topics by state and time. Tests would be sharper with 
access to absolute measures of interest rather than proportional scales and if one could 
easily separate out searches on Clinton from searches on her emails. But even the relative 
data indicate raise doubts. Searches on the “Podesta emails” and a few closely related 
search terms certainly do increase across the nation when the story breaks. In the US as a 
whole, there is a spike, followed by a steep and rapid decay. But the spike is hardly 
uniform. By far the largest happens – surprise – in the District of Columbia. Interest 
elsewhere is more modest, even in neighboring Virginia, though it ran higher there than 
in many other states.. In the three non-southern consensus battleground states of 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, where Trump eked out crucial wins, it is 
substantially less: Relative scores are markedly lower, with interest in Wisconsin 
particularly anemic (41 against the Washington, D.C. top of 100), which is hard to square 
with claims that some emails had exceptionally powerful effects there.21 Interest in 
Florida and North Carolina, two other states that the Trump campaign also regarded as 
battleground states at least after mid-August (see below) was also modest and particularly 
anemic in areas in both that in the end broke relatively heavily for Trump.  That Hillary 
Clinton’s lead in the national polls was higher nine days after the Podesta emails story 
broke does not surprise us and confirms our misgivings. 
In the final days of the campaign Trump did interject more references to the 
emails into his speeches. Interest revived modestly (in tandem, Google Trends suggests, 
with searches on Trump and women, which we believe likely dominated again). The 
flurry rises to about half the level of the earlier peaks – but the pattern of relatively lower 
interest in most battleground states persists, though the complexities of distinguishing 
between general searches on Clinton, on her emails, and on Podesta’s make drawing firm 
conclusions impossible. By then, as will become clearer in a minute, many other things 
were happening that seem far more likely to impress large numbers of voters. 
The assertions about Russian internet trolling and bots (trolls are alive; the bots 
are automatized) are harder to evaluate. They have never really been systematically 
detailed. In the strongest version, the Russians assisted the admittedly well organized and 
highly professional Trump internet campaign (or, in some tellings, the Republican 
National Committee) by flooding battleground states with fake news and messages 
relayed via internet “bots” – internet sites that automatically amplify by bouncing 
campaign messages, even though they may not even be located in the United States. 
Depending on who’s talking, the aim was to identify likely Trump voters or discourage 
turnout on the Democratic side by means of negative messages. Less extreme accounts 
simply allege unspecified Russian internet support.22  
We will return to this topic later in the paper, but a brief discussion can clarify 
issues that could otherwise cause trouble. Firstly, we concur that Russian capabilities in 
so-called “organic” internet messaging are well developed. It is also clear that the US and 
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Russian intelligences services have been dueling for a long time, so that it would be 
surprising if Russian agencies or their cutouts working in this area simply sat out the US 
election.23  
But the central point is understanding how Trump could reach so far into 
traditional Democratic territory. And here we think the decisive factor is that the real 
masters of these black arts are American or Anglo-American firms. These compete 
directly with Silicon Valley and leading advertising firms for programmers and 
personnel. They rely almost entirely on data purchased from Google, Facebook, or other 
suppliers, not Russia. American regulators do next to nothing to protect the privacy of 
voters and citizens, and, as we have shown in several studies, leading telecom firms are 
major political actors and giant political contributors (Ferguson et al., 2013) (Ferguson et 
al., 2017). As a result, data on the habits and preferences of individual internet users are 
commercially available in astounding detail and quantities for relatively modest prices – 
even details of individual credit card purchases.  
The American giants for sure harbor abundant data on the constellation of bots, 
I.P. addresses, and messages that streamed to the electorate. But they have been very coy 
about releasing that data or making it available to independent researchers. It now seems 
reasonably clear that Facebook recognized that something unusual might be afoot in June 
of 2016 and, in contrast to the Democratic National Committee, went immediately to the 
FBI with the news.24 The company’s subsequent public disclosures have clearly been 
grudging and piecemeal, with few details offered, though we now know that prominent 
Democrats repeatedly implored the firm to investigate and stop dismissing notions that 
nothing significant could have occurred (Entous et al., 2017b). The firm left it to other 
researchers to point out that the total “reach” of any effort undertaken by Russian actors 
should not be measured by the number of times Americans looked at the ads Facebook 
finally turned over to Congressional committees. Their sites also posted content, which 
users could share with their friends and acquaintances. 
Testimony by tech company executives at a hearing before the Senate Intelligence 
Committee suggested that as many as 126 million Americans might have come into web 
contact with various ads on Facebook while another 20 million people may have been 
reached via Instagram. 25 Another study that examined only a sliver of such sites 
suggested that literally millions of pages of content might in fact have been shared by 
users (Albright, 2017a). These numbers, however, need to be put in context: They 
represent a tiny fraction of the “33 trillion posts Americans saw in their Facebook news 
feeds between 2015 and 2017…Facebook reported that a quarter of the ads were never 
seen by anyone. And — with the average Facebook user sifting through 220 news-feed 
posts a day — many of the rest were simply glanced at, scrolled past and forgotten” 
(Ruffini, 2017). 
In the absence of data transparency, we are reserved about all claims by 
Facebook, Twitter, Google, or anyone else about what ads they did or did not sell or the 
uses of the sites; we have trouble understanding why several Congressional committees 
were so slow to require full public disclosure of exact information, especially once the 
companies admitted that the ads already ran in public. For the same reason, we are 
cautious about assertions by Trump campaign workers that they did not find Twitter very 
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useful, though that assertion is potentially very telling, since so many more bots are 
keyed to Twitter, rather than Facebook (LoBianco, 2017).. 
We take much more seriously the findings of empirical studies of overall election 
communication patterns by independent researchers who gathered their own data. 
Jonathan Albright has attempted to map the “ecology” of both left and right networks in 
several recent studies. His work emphasizes the unusually dense, ramified character of 
the right wing messaging networks that developed over the last few years: “to put it 
bluntly, ‘right-wing’ news is everywhere: Twitter accounts, Facebook pages, small issue-
based websites, large news websites, Wordpress blogs, Google Plus (?), Pinterest pages, 
Reddit threads, etc.” (Albright, 2016).  
A Harvard study of the internet in the 2016 presidential election makes a similar 
point: “Our clearest and most significant observation is that the American political 
system has seen not a symmetrical polarization of the two sides of the political map, but 
rather the emergence of a discrete and relatively insular right-wing media ecosystem 
whose shape and communications practices differ sharply from the rest of the media 
ecosystem, ranging from the center-right to the left. Right-wing media were centered on 
Breitbart and Fox News, and they presented partisan-disciplined messaging, which was 
not the case for the traditional professional media that were the center of attention across 
the rest of the media sphere” (Faris et al., 2017). 
Such studies suggest that stories hyping “the sophistication of an influence 
campaign slickly crafted to mimic and infiltrate U.S. political discourse while also 
seeking to heighten tensions between groups already wary of one another” by the 
Russians miss the mark. (Entous et al., 2017c). By 2016, the Republican right had 
developed internet outreach and political advertising into a fine art and on a massive scale 
quite on its own (Faris et al., 2017) (Albright, 2016). Large numbers of conservative 
websites, including many that that tolerated or actively encouraged white supremacy and 
contempt for immigrants, African-Americans, Hispanics, Jews, or the aspirations of 
women had been hard at work for years stoking up “tensions between groups already 
wary of one another.”26 Breitbart and other organizations were in fact going global, 
opening offices abroad and establishing contacts with like-minded groups elsewhere. 
Whatever the Russians were up to, they could hardly hope to add much value to the vast 
Made in America bombardment already underway. Nobody sows chaos like Breitbart or 
the Drudge Report, as the New York Times documented in one Idaho town (Dickerson, 
2017). 
Some firms could add value though, but every one of them was as American as 
apple pie. With no publicity, the tech giants – Google, Facebook, Twitter – were all 
trying to muscle in on the richly rewarding arena of campaign consulting. Their aim was 
not to “weaponize” internet ads, in the ominous sounding term that analysts of Russian 
internet now throw around – their interest lay in monetizing them, just as they have 
restlessly tried to do in everything they engage in. Two scholars who analyzed these 
efforts describe how the companies went about this: “For example, these firms offer an 
extensive array of campaign services — including advising campaigns on everything 
from the content of ads and other communications to the specific groups they might 
benefit most from targeting, and how best to reach them…all three of these firms have 
 13 
dedicated partisan teams that work with campaigns. Staffers work with campaigns to 
guide advertising buys, boost engagement around online ads, and shepherd the use of 
their platforms” (Kreiss and McGregor, 2017). 
The researchers’ assessment that such services “were far more consequential in 
terms of the election outcome,” with a “far greater reach than Russian bots and fake news 
sites” strikes us as spot on (Kreiss and McGregor, 2017). As Albright cautioned in an 
earlier study, “before we keep pointing fingers at specific countries and tweeting about 
companies “hacking the election,” as well as to solve the scourge of “fake news,” it might 
be good to look inward. By this, I mean we should start the quest for transparency in 
politics with a few firms based in New York City and Silicon Valley.”27 We are confident 
that it will eventually become clear that Russian efforts were distributed over many 
platforms besides Facebook, making total expenditures appreciably higher. But they will 
still pale beside those of the US Alt Right networks and the Trump campaign’s own 
investments, which were at once gigantic and carefully targeted (Gold and Dwoskin, 
2017). 
The notion that Republican vote suppression campaigns needed Russian 
assistance is particularly silly. It is almost laughable given the barely disguised 
pronouncements of so many Republican election officials in Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin, North Carolina and other states and – until efforts to smother turnout became 
controversial – the unguarded comments of Trump’s own campaign (Wines, 2016) 
(Bump, 2017) (Barajas, 2016).28 Suggestions that internet campaigning was responsible 
for Clinton’s poor showing in the crucial Detroit area are particularly difficult to accept, 
since about 40% of the city’s population has no internet access, because they are too poor 
to interest the local telecom oligopoly (Rogers, 2017). 
Not surprisingly, the evidence revealed thus far does not support strong claims 
about the likely success of Russian efforts, though of course the public outrage at outside 
meddling is easy to understand. The speculative character of many accounts even in the 
mainstream media is obvious. Several, such as widely circulated declaration by the 
Department of Homeland Security that 21 state election systems had been hacked during 
the election, have collapsed within days of being put forward when state electoral 
officials strongly disputed them (Greenwald, 2017), though some mainstream press 
accounts continue to repeat them.29  Other tales about Macedonian troll factories 
churning out stories at the instigation of the Kremlin, are clearly exaggerated. When 
reporters from Wired and CNN showed up to check, the major inspiration turned out to 
be Adam Smith and the spirit of free enterprise: out of work locals had discovered that 
they could monetize clicks on advertising sites. More than a few had tried out several 
candidates before discovering that Trump ads generated more clicks than anyone else’s.30  
The paid ads Facebook has disclosed were hardly on the scale one would expect 
for an all-out effort ($100,000), though (as noted above) their reach can be vastly 
extended by individual sharing and we expect more action on other platforms will turn 
up. A more serious problem for strong claims is timing, since the buys were scattered 
through 2015, 2016 and 2017 and across states, and appear to have focused often on 
states that had no chance of ever tipping in favor of Clinton. Subsequent revelations by 
Facebook underscore the importance of this issue, since more than half of its ads are 
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admitted to have run after the election (Isaac and Shane, 2017). The Senate Intelligence 
Committee hearings produced truly microscopic numbers for putative Russian efforts 
directed at the key battleground states of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan: For 
Wisconsin, $1,979, with all but $54 dollars of this spent during the primary. Russian 
Facebook spending in the other two was even more minuscule:  Pennsylvania absorbed 
all of $823 and Michigan $300 (Madrigal, 2017) (Ruffini, 2017). Unless Facebook 
discloses some vast new trove, the conclusion has to be that this was no full court press. 
The few individual cases that have so far become public only increase one’s 
skepticism. One episode in Texas ballyhooed as a direct effort to affect the election 
proves on examination to be flimsy indeed.  This involved a series of rallies called in late  
October and early November, 2016 in favor of Texas Independence and against 
immigrants and Hillary Clinton (Bertrand, 2017). But the idea that such a campaign could 
help move a pro-Clinton state into Trump’s column can only be described as harebrained:  
Texas was already solidly for Trump. The project’s influence can be easily tested with 
Google Trends (and the election results in Texas); it made no discernible impact at all.31 
Another widely touted case in Florida fails the same tests, though there at least a 
battleground state was involved (Collins et al., 2017). 
These are all admittedly individual cases. More systematic assessments are 
hobbled by the slowness of American authorities and the Silicon Valley giants to release 
much data and by the entrance into the debate of various groups with obvious foreign 
policy axes to grind (Greenwald, 2017).  More than a few studies have given up sifting 
through the welter of internet news and commentary in favor of resting identifications of 
sites as “Russian” or “Russian influenced” on the basis of views discussed that the 
analysts find politically distasteful. This leads to inflated measures of Russian influence 
that count websites that are plainly not Russian inspired at all, but simply non-
mainstream or even, sometimes, it appears, simply critical of Likud Party interpretations 
of Israeli interests.  
One careful and comprehensive assessment of internet messaging in the final ten 
days of the campaign has appeared, however, and its findings are eye-opening. The 
researchers attempted to measure the targeting of individual states by “tweets with junk 
news, links to unverified WikiLeaks pages, or links to Russian content (such as Russia 
Today or Sputnik).” They suggest that “when links to Russian content and unverified 
WikiLeaks stories are added to the volume of junk news, fully 32% of all the successfully 
catalogued political content was polarizing, conspiracy driven, and of an untrustworthy 
provenance.” Then they deliver what they think is their punch line: “Average levels of 
misinformation were higher in swing states than in uncontested states, even when 
weighted for the relative size of the user population in each state”(Howard et al., 2017). 
 This study is instructive on several accounts. As the authors recognize, its 
measure of fake news clearly embraces far more than Russian sourced material; in all 
likelihood, most of what it counts is coming from the far right, mixed perhaps with some 
content originating from far left sources with no links to Russia. But what stands out is 
the quantitative evidence of how poorly all this content was actually targeted on swing 
states. The test the study performs is extremely weak: a comparison of the numbers of 
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swing states above and below the US average. It finds somewhat more swing states rank 
above average in fake news.  
A stronger test supports a strikingly different conclusion: As the figures quoted 
above in the Senate Intelligence Committee hearings suggest, in fact any targeting was 
very poorly executed. Swing states were not difficult to identify: many polls and news 
stories, not to mention the presidential campaigns themselves, talked of little else. If we 
lay aside quibbles about how many states really qualified as “swing” states and simply 
accept the study’s measures, then a much more revealing test is easy to apply. Were 
targeting perfect, all the states identified as swing should stand at the very top of the fake 
news ranking. To the extent non-swing states crowd those states out, would-be targeters 
have missed their mark. In fact the essay’s Table 2 testifies to a gang that can’t shoot 
straight: the state with by far the heaviest dose of fake news was West Virginia, which 
was a lock for Trump. Most other states in the top rankings are also non-swing. By 
contrast, Wisconsin and other crucial states show near the bottom. The conclusion has to 
be that targeting was very poor; if you treated the question as a special case of an exam in 
American studies, then only 7 of the 16 swing states were correctly identified – a failing 
grade by most standards.  
So much for Twitter. No comparably broad survey of Facebook has so far been 
published. What has been selectively leaked about isolated swing states on Facebook 
raises suspicions of cherry picking; serious targeting using Facebook, like Twitter, could 
not focus simply on one or two states. Doubts are increased by a carefully documented 
study of a sliver of the known sites. The author rightfully draws attention to the defects of 
simply using views of the ads, and his analysis of the sharing of various page contents is 
illuminating. But his time graph also shows a very large part of the effort came after the 
election. As he notes, the pattern suggests that many of the pre-election ads may indeed 
have attempted to influence voters, but the broader record he presents is consonant with 
the indifferent targeting revealed in the Twitter study (Albright, 2017a) (Timberg, 2017). 
Efforts to distort elections have to precede or coincide with Election Day; afterward the 
horse has left the barn. 
Strong claims about the potency of relatively small-scale and poorly targeted 
internet appeals and propaganda also fit badly with the known facts of how political 
advertising reaches voters. In 2016 television, not the internet, was still the main source 
of campaign news for Americans. Several studies have attempted to compare the 
effectiveness of television ads versus internet advertising; in all of these, the amount of 
repetition necessary on average to change minds seems very high; the fact that as many 
as ten million Americans might have seen one or another ad sounds impressive but it is 
anything but conclusive (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017) (Isaac and Shane, 2017). Even 
without making strong assumptions about rates of repetition, on the evidence thus far it 
seems likely that the number of minds changed or immobilized by any Russian trolls 
could not have been large by comparison with all the other sources bombarding voters.  
The internet trails well behind TV, not just in use, but in effective influence. 
Surveys suggest that only 4% of American adults who use the web trust the information 
they get from social media “a lot”; a mere 30% trust it even “some” (Mitchell et al., 
2016).. It is worth emphasizing that no matter how often one hears that the internet has 
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divided Americans into single minded camps walled off from other points of view, much 
empirical evidence points in the opposite direction. The echo chamber claim overlooks 
the range and number of alternative views that retweets and messages from friends and 
acquaintances expose Americans to. In addition, the biggest increases in political 
polarization over the last decades occurred in the segments of the electorate that are least 
connected to the internet.32 
One can always riposte that in an election this close, any feather tossed on the 
scales could prove decisive. That response makes more mathematical than practical 
sense, however. In the campaign’s final days, feathers were flying everywhere – and 
virtually none were imported.  
 
4. The Comey Intervention. 
The initial evidence, for example, that Comey tipped the scales looked very 
compelling and continues to be widely repeated: A striking graph seemed to show 
Clinton’s support collapsing immediately after his announcement. Some studies of 
Trump and Clinton’s campaign echo this judgment. Eventually, however, it transpired 
that Clinton’s polls started falling in surveys taken before but mostly not released until 
after the announcement (Cohn, 2016). Skeptics also observed that a highly publicized 
October 24th notice of sweeping price hikes for health care insurance under President 
Obama’s Affordable Care Act appeared to fit the data even better – and that this, too, was 
a development that Trump seized upon in his campaigning.  Curiously, post-campaign 
studies devote virtually no attention to this health care setback, though Bill Clinton 
himself had gone off script earlier out of anxiety about the issue’s potential importance.33  
Since then much of the argument has been conducted in terms of how best to 
aggregate polls that did indeed appear to be turning before Comey spoke out. The 
problem is easy to state but hard to assess concretely. Evaluating individual polls is 
difficult and time-consuming (and often impossible, because their sponsors often reveal 
so little). Many analysts therefore simply average them all. But if you insist on 
aggregating polls on a rolling basis over several days, recognizing real turning points 
inevitably is very difficult. After their claims were challenged, some analysts who 
originally blamed Comey agreed that in principle some adjustments were necessary. Then 
they proposed “corrections” that reinstated, almost miraculously, their original 
conclusions. By contrast, a committee of the American Association of Public Opinion 
Research reached a negative verdict: It concluded that Comey’s announcement “had an 
immediate, negative impact for Clinton on the order of 2 percentage points. The apparent 
impact did not last, as support for Clinton tended to tick up in the days just prior to the 
election" (Ad Hoc Committee, 2017). 
 The argument rages still. Our sympathies are firmly with the skeptics. Though no 
single indicator is likely to resolve such issues, it is striking that the price of winner-take-
all contracts on a Trump victory doubled in the days ahead of Comey’s announcement – a 
strong indicator that somebody’s sentiment was changing.34 But we also believe that 
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discussions of the election’s final days have ignored a raft of other potentially important 
complicating factors. 
 Save for Clinton’s own memoir and a handful of other discussions, most accounts 
blaming Comey are importantly skewed: Implicitly they assume the mass media were 
passive relay devices. That hardly does justice to the quantitative evidence of the media 
reaction: Empirical studies suggest that the media piled on when the news came out. 
Stories about Clinton’s credibility and character crowded out all other themes related to 
her candidacy for more than a week (Patterson, 2016a). 
 This should put a different face on matters: Mass media hype of a dubious 
pronouncement by an FBI Director raises questions of another order. If the major media 
manufactured a mountain out of a hill, we would like to know why. A key question 
should be the balance struck between questions about each of the protagonists. In theory, 
the media could have lavished more attention on Comey’s departure from FBI norms 
than old questions about Clinton. The stories bubbling up about discord within the FBI 
could have received more attention, instead of being virtually buried. These would 
inevitably would have raised questions about partisan intent, likely weakening whatever 
influence the episode had. 
 
5. Beyond the Russians and Comey 
An obvious background factor – that the Clinton campaign emphasized candidate 
and personal issues and avoided policy discussions to a degree without precedent in any 
previous election for which measurements exist – adds further complexity (Fowler et al., 
2016). It pushes the inquiry back one critical stage: Why did the campaign say so little 
about policy, when articulated positions on appealing issues could have provided a base 
to fall back upon in adversity? We believe this question has a clear answer discussed 
below, and it has nothing to do with the FBI. 
But the lame Clinton campaign and even its now-famous refusals to campaign in 
Wisconsin or buy earlier advertising in Michigan are not the only factors that likely 
helped Trump burst through the sound barrier at the end. The poll analysts who lovingly 
chronicle every twist and turn in surveys have mostly been strangely uninterested in 
exploring the extent to which vote suppression figured in the battleground states and 
some others where outcomes ran close, notably North Carolina. The omission is 
particularly odd given, as mentioned above, the disarming candor of key Republican 
election officials in so many states.  
Analysts have also closed their eyes to another factor that surely had major effects 
on Democratic prospects in all three key non-southern battleground states that Clinton 
lost by a hairsbreadth -- Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Each was the site of 
sweeping and successful anti-union drives led by employers and Republican politicians.  
As Table 1 indicates, all three rank at or near the very top of states showing declines in 
unionization rates between 2008 and 2016 – cliff-like drops that occurred while a 
Democratic President sat in the White House, controlling both the Labor and the Justice 
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Departments. We do not find it mysterious that blue collar workers in those states might 
be a tad less enthusiastic about what many described as an Obama “third term” or 
perhaps even wonder what the Clinton Foundation was doing as the only institutions that 
protected their livelihood were destroyed or vastly weakened. 
 
Table I About Here 
 
 
Pundits and scholars alike have also closed their eyes to even the grossest facts 
about political money in the final days. Many campaign accounts implicitly repeat 
Trump’s own nostrum that he was not dependent on outside money and take it for 
granted that he was running a lean campaign. We will show below that by October this 
was campaign hype, pure and simple.  
 
6. Follow the Money 
What happened in the final weeks of the campaign was extraordinary. Firstly, a 
giant wave of dark money poured into Trump’s own campaign – one that towered over 
anything in 2016 or even Mitt Romney’s munificently financed 2012 effort – to say 
nothing of any Russian Facebook experiments. The gushing torrent, along with all the 
other funds from identifiable donors that flowed in in the campaign’s final stages should 
refocus debates about that period. (See Figure 1, below.) Maybe all that happened is that 
money talked, not least in the famous last ad invoking Soros, Blankfein, and Yellin 
apparently focused on the battleground states. 
 
 
Figure 1 About Here 
 
 
Bolstering suspicions that a wave of last minute money might actually be the most 
basic explanation for the Clinton collapse is a fact that virtually no analysts have reflected 
upon: Her late October fall in the polls was not unique. Democratic chances of taking the 
Senate unraveled virtually in lock step.  
This was no accident, and here one can trace a clear green thread. Earlier in 
October, when Trump’s case still appeared hopeless, Senate Republican Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell and his entourage started pitching many famous businessmen and 
 19 
women. Hillary Clinton in the White House, ran their argument, would be awful, but 
losing control of the Senate would be Armageddon. McConnell, like most politicians, had 
a history of crying wolf, but by mid-October, polls and betting odds alike suggested that 
chances of the Republicans losing control of the Senate were excellent (Troyan and 
Schouten, 2016, Blumenthal, 2017, Isenstadt, 2016). 
 Nixon’s Attorney General, John Mitchell, once famously quoted an old adage 
that when the going gets tough, the tough get going. In 2016, the tough, or at least the 
super-affluent, certainly got going.  Our data show that yet another gigantic wave of 
money flowed in from alarmed business interests, including the Kochs and their allies, 
who were not actively supporting Trump.35 Officially the money was for Senate races, 
but our observation is that late-stage campaigning for down-ballot offices often spills 
over on to candidates for the party at large. It is much easier to cooperate with state and 
national party organizations and push the whole ticket, whatever poses individual 
Republican Senate candidates were striking.  Statistically sorting out the joint impact of 
these two ocean swells is not possible given existing data, but one fact is very telling. For 
the first time in the entire history of the United States, the partisan outcome of Senate 
races coincided perfectly with the results of every state’s presidential balloting (Enten, 
2016).  
The dual unravelling of the Democrats is apparent in polls and Iowa market 
contract prices. Figure 2 graphs the Iowa Electronic Market prices for winner-take-all 
presidential contracts against the prices of a contract on the combination of a Republican 
House and a Democratic Senate. Because almost nobody believed the Democrats could 
win back the House by then, variation in the Congressional contract reflects changes in 
perceptions of Democratic Senate prospects. The two declines very closely track each 
other, with the difference that Clinton, who had proportionately more money than many 
hapless Democratic Senate candidates, was able to scramble back. 
  
 
Figure 2 About Here  
 
 
The notion that Comey or even the Russians could be responsible for both 
collapses is outlandish. Something else must in large part have driven both outcomes.36 
Parallel waves of money is the obvious explanation and our data show that both occurred 





7. Posing the Right Questions 
  In an election as close as that of 2016, one could debate forever how all these 
factors played out, especially since big, nationally representative voter surveys are likely 
to mirror only imperfectly the peculiarities of a few battleground states. In the spirit of Sir 
Peter Medawar’s dictum that science involves the art of the soluble, accordingly, we 
think that a far more fruitful approach is to alter the question.  
 It is time to focus on the dominating fact that became visible in the 2014 
congressional elections: that American politics has strayed into some strange new 
Twilight Zone – and try to understand how this sovereign fact shaped the shocking 
outcome of the presidential election.  
This task, in our view, requires framing clear answers to three questions. The first 
is what drove the Republican primaries so badly off script. At the start, for most 
observers, the dominant narrative was crystal clear: Jeb Bush would once again summon 
the legendary Golden Horde that had powered the campaigns of his brother and father 
and float to victory on a tidal wave of money. The Kochs and other well-heeled interests 
would promote challengers even further to the right, but in the end the “Kochtopus” 
would close ranks with the rest of the party after Jeb! won. Champions of the religious 
right and libertarians would also dip their toes into the water and try to fire up their 
supporters. They would shake, rattle, and roll and then, as they ran out of money, they 
would bow out with more or less grace. With surging hopes for a cabinet position or a 
slot on Fox News they would fall in with the great Republican Crusade against a Second 
Coming of the Clintons. 
 Obviously most of this never happened, though it is interesting to see how some 
of the also rans, notably the evangelicals, found paths to endorsing a nominee whose 
public comments about women suggested he was likely much more comfortable with 
Mary Magdalen 1.0 than the Virgin.37  
The second question concerns the stunning course of the Democratic campaign. 
This is every bit as rivetingly mysterious as the Trump phenomenon: Anyone who 
predicted as the campaign got underway that a professed democratic socialist would win 
more than 13 million votes running against Hillary Clinton, would openly attack Wall 
Street’s headlock on the Democratic Party on prime time TV, and actually win primaries 
in big industrial states like Michigan while sweeping through western caucuses, would 
have been laughed off the stage. The Sanders phenomenon needs a searching 
examination. We suspect it is every bit as important for the future as the outcome on the 
Republican side. 
Finally comes the most immediate mystery of all: what explains the roller coaster 
course of the Trump campaign?  How the real estate magnate breezed past the rest of the 
Republican field merits a closer look than it has so far received.  Was his early success 
truly all owed to his celebrity candidacy or were other factors important?  Did he really 
pay for the whole campaign himself, as he kept saying? And did he run on a shoestring? 
Are the oft-repeated claims that he enjoyed little support in Silicon Valley aside from 
Peter Thiel really true?  
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Once he won the nomination, the main questions are two: Firstly, how much of 
the party consolidated around him and how did that affect the financing of the campaign? 
Was his candidacy still mostly self-financed or did Trump, Inc., begin selling shares? If 
so, who purchased them?  Secondly, how did the Trump campaign climb out of the crater 
that it had dug itself into by midsummer?  As late as August 14, 2016, Trump’s chances 
appeared almost hopeless: you could buy a contract that would pay a hundred dollars in 
the event he won for twenty-two dollars on the Iowa Trading Markets Exchange.  
But then something eerie happened. Conservative billionaire daughter Rebekah 
Mercer personally buttonholed Trump at a fundraiser. She advised him to stay in the race, 
but to fire Paul Manafort and turn over direction of the campaign to Steve Bannon and 
Kellyanne Conway (Green, 2017). Trump took her advice, and the rest is history. But 
what exactly did that dynamic duo do to bring about perhaps the greatest turnabout in 
American electoral history? If it wasn’t just the Russians or Comey, what exactly was the 
recipe? A data processing miracle conjured up by Cambridge Analytica, the mysterious 
data firm at least partly owned by the Mercers that worked alongside Giles-Parscale, the 
Dallas digital outfit that had long worked for Trump?38 Or were there more fundamental 
flaws in Clinton’s campaign that Bannon and Conway’s strategy exploited – besides the 
confusion and restless infighting emphasized in some excellent post-election studies 
(Allen and Parnes, 2017) (Brazile, 2017)? Most importantly, did other powerful but less 
heralded forces work in the background with the new leadership to provide the campaign 
with the racer’s edge? Forces that perhaps still figure importantly in the new 
administration? 
 
8. The Twilight Zone 
  All efforts to grapple with these questions quickly run into a striking paradox – 
one that betrays a revealing clue about the nature of the 2016 shock. In 2014, signs of a 
dramatic departure from business as usual could be read off voting returns, albeit in a 
very unconventional way: To perceive them, one had to look past the details of the 
partisan split and changes in seats to focus on voting turnout in a long term historical 
perspective.  
2016 is very different. We agree with analysts who suggest that a finely textured 
analysis of the presidential vote can detect some far-reaching changes in the attitudes of 
some voters. But these alterations are mostly subtle. No matter how anyone slices and 
dices the election returns, it would be a stretch to claim that they add up to anything 
momentous enough to account for the stunning political shifts that are happening right in 
front of everyone’s eyes. Neither turnout nor the partisan division of the vote at any level 
looks all that different from other recent elections. As several political scientists quickly 
proclaimed after the dust settled, signs of major change are virtually non-existent by the 
standards of election markers that conventional political science relies on. Indeed 2016’s 
alterations in voting behavior are so minute that the pattern is only barely differentiated 
from 2012.  If one considers only aggregate returns, the election that produced Trump 
and Sanders looks like a “remarkably ordinary election outcome, primarily reflecting 
partisan patterns familiar from previous election cycles” (Bartels, 2016)39 
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We think this is like trying to make sense of the last days of Pompeii while 
resolutely ignoring Mt. Vesuvius. So where is the decisive evidence of historic upheaval? 
This question has a simple answer in our view: Stop focusing simply on voting patterns 
and analyze the election in terms of the investment approach to political parties that we 
normally employ.  
 Essentially a method for investigating how industrial structures and social 
conflicts figure in political outcomes, this approach developed out of the broader 
literature on industrial structure fitfully advanced over several generations by such 
scholars as Gerschenkron, Kehr, Rosenberg, and Kurth.40 Its starting point is the 
acknowledgment that in most modern countries, political action is far more costly in 
terms of both time and money than classical democratic theories imagined (Ferguson, 
1995a). As a consequence, popular control of the state depends on the extent to which 
ordinary citizens can bear those costs.  Nothing metaphysical is implied here: to control 
the state citizens need to be able to share costs and pool resources easily. In practical 
terms, this requires functioning organizations – unions, neighborhood organizations, 
cooperatives, etc. – in civil society that represent them without enormous expenditures of 
time and money. There is one and only one guarantee of this: those organizations have to 
be controlled by and financially dependent on them. If existing parties are not controlled 
by voters, then they have to undertake the comparatively expensive process of running 
candidates of their own. To the extent that “secondary” organizations flourish, or the 
population directly invests its own resources in candidates, popular control of the state 
and effective mass political movements will flourish (Ferguson, 1995a).  
Where investment and organization by average citizens is weak, however, power 
passes by default to major investor groups, which can far more easily bear the costs of 
contending for control of the state. These normally align in distinctive blocs arising out of 
historically specific patterns of industry structures (where “industry” embraces finance, 
mining, agriculture, and services alike). In most modern market-dominated societies 
(those celebrated recently as enjoying the “end of History”), levels of effective popular 
organization are generally low, while the costs of political action, in terms of both 
information and transactional obstacles, are high. The result is that conflicts within the 
business community normally dominate contests within and between political parties – 
the exact opposite of what many earlier social theorists expected, who imagined 
“business” and “labor” confronting each other in separate parties. Few indeed are the 
labor movements today that can realistically expect to control parties of their own 
(Ferguson, 1995a). 
Analyzing elections, accordingly, should begin with at least an implicit 
assessment of the state of mass organization. But the next step is a careful assessment of 
the industrial structure, particularly of large firms, followed by the application of the 
fundamental principle of the investment theory of partisan competition. Only candidates 
and positions that can be financed can be presented to voters. As a result, in countries like 
the US and, increasingly, Western Europe, political parties are first of all bank accounts. 
With certain qualifications, one must pay to play. Understanding any given election, 
therefore, requires a financial X-ray of the power blocs that dominate the major parties, 
with both inter- and intra- industrial analysis of their constituent elements. 
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 Such analysis normally embraces both institutional and personal factors. It brings 
into play a much broader “spectrum of political money” than just formal campaign 
spending (Ferguson, 2014a). In the US and some other developed countries, however, 
that last category bulks so large that breaking it down sheds real light on political 
dynamics. Indeed, the US may be in a class by itself in this regard. 
We are the first to admit that analyzing campaign financing is astonishingly 
difficult, despite the surface transparency of the records. In federal elections in the US, 
two different streams of contributions are reported to two different government agencies 
– the Federal Election Commission and the Internal Revenue Service. Each of these 
agencies uses a different reporting system with radically different formats and disclosure 
deadlines (Ferguson et al., 2013). Almost the only thing the two bureaucracies have in 
common is their low level of zeal for ensuring that the money they track is reported with 
all the basic information required by law. That nonchalance and the lack of 
standardization makes scrutiny of the data absurdly difficult. 
 Contributors, for example, routinely employ different forms of their names and 
combinations of initials for different donations. They often list different addresses and – 
depending on their situations – inconsistently report occupations and employers. Business 
executives who chair giant corporations, for example, will sometimes cheekily list their 
occupations as “retired” or assign any of several firms they have relationships with as 
their employer of record. On occasion active bankers report working in units long ago 
gobbled up by some other giant. Corporations employ a raft of similar (mostly legal) 
dodges, especially with subsidiaries. And that is before one gets to the now famous 
category of “dark money,” where the true source of the financing is shrouded by 
streaming the lucre through faux “charities” that are not required to disclose donors. 
We have developed complex statistical routines to pierce most of these veils and 
identify contributors, including assigning them appropriate industry codes. We discuss 
these methods in more detail in (Ferguson et al., 2013) and (Ferguson et al., 2016).41  
Proceeding in this way yields many insights that are simply not available if one 
looks only at voting patterns. The results make is easy to specify precisely what is 
distinctive about the 2016 election. We can also explain very simply what brought about 
the dramatic changes that we identify and provide real answers to the three questions 
about the course of the election posed above. 
We consider each of these issues one after the other. We tackle first the question 
of what made 2016 so extraordinary, then explain the factors driving the change, before 
presenting our answers to the three sets of questions posed earlier. 
 
9. What Changed 
Tables 2 and 3 display some statistics that show directly what was so remarkable 
about the 2016 election. They testify to the entry of dramatic new forces into the political 
system – eruptions of a kind that are extremely rare in American history. 
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The first compares small donations (less than $200 in total from donors, the 
threshold for FEC reporting) for the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates 
in 2016. For comparison, Table 3 displays comparable figures for 2012 major party 
candidates. The totals are of real interest in their own right, but the relative proportions 
large and small contributors are what is telling. 2016 almost perfectly inverts the pattern 
of the earlier election.  In 2016, Donald Trump attracted a higher percentage of small 
contributions than President Obama did in 2012.   
 
 
Tables 2 and 3 About Here 
 
 
Fully comparable data for earlier elections does not exist, in part because price 
changes have gradually lowered the value of contributions below the legal threshold, 
which hasn’t changed since 1979 (thus rendering more recent donations truly “small”) 
and also due to drastic regulatory changes earlier in the seventies.  We thus have to be 
cautious. But we believe that the 2012 pattern is representative of essentially all 
presidential elections since the New Deal, with the possible exception of 1964, when so 
many big businesses and wealthy Americans deserted Barry Goldwater, the Republican 
nominee, for President Lyndon Johnson (Ferguson and Rogers, 1986). Normally in 
general elections, the Democratic candidate attracted more small money. Trump shattered 
this pattern, which we regard as the equivalent of forcing water suddenly to flow up hill. 
Failed Republican primary candidates, especially Evangelicals, have often attracted 
relatively high percentages of small funds, but that reflects their inability to secure larger 
donations – compare the discussion of 2012 in (Ferguson et al., 2013). The striking 
novelty here is the massive weight of small contributions in a campaign that brought in 
really large amounts of money. 
 With respect to the Sanders campaign, these tables show something we are 
confident is without precedent in American politics not just since the New Deal, but 
across virtually the whole of American history, waiving the dubious case of the legendary 
1896 election: a major presidential candidate waging a strong, highly competitive 
campaign whose support from big business is essentially zero.42 We are hardly the first to 
notice this fact, but like many other others, we had trouble believing our eyes. Thus we 
checked carefully. Sanders stands out not only for the high percentage of small 
contributions, but the minuscule totals of large contributions in the aggregate. Later in 
this essay, when we consider the sectoral breakdown of contributions, we will see that the 
handful of small donations scattered among our counts of big business contributions to 
Sanders clearly derive from many lower level employees, not top management. The few 
large contributions arise from aggregated contributions from a handful of unions (the 
official union leadership of most unions supported Hillary Clinton, see below). In 2016, 
Bernie Sanders was sui generis – not at all comparable to Ron Paul, whose 2012 
 25 
campaign was hoisted aloft in part by a Super PAC funded by Peter Thiel and other 
mega-donors (Ferguson et al., 2013). He was exactly what he appeared to be, something 
truly new under the American sun. 
The similarity in the voting patterns of 2012 and 2016, then, is deceiving. Behind 
the similarities lurk dramatic changes in patterns of political investment, testifying to the 
mobilization of powerful new forces into the political arena. The obvious next question is 
why they occurred in 2016. 
 
10. Misery in a Dual Economy 
 To the question why such big changes in 2015, our answer is straightforward: The 
mass movements that formed behind Trump and Sanders are consequences of the 
development of a dual economy in America.  
 The theory of a dual economy is best regarded not as a fully elaborated set of 
propositions, but as an evolving set of facts that various researchers have uncovered in 
the course of ongoing research. At the start, a word of warning: The scholars working in 
this area depart from different standpoints and use various methods, so their treatments of 
certain issues can differ sharply. Several whose work is clearly relevant, do not use the 
term “dual economy” at all. But they spotlight a set of facts that is crucial to 
understanding how American politics passed into the Twilight Zone. Here our intent is 
not to exhaustively survey the whole body of work, but to outline what matters most for 
understanding 2016. 
 Peter Temin crystallized the discussion (Temin, 2015) (Temin, 2016). His starting 
point was the now well-documented extreme polarization of income and wealth over the 
last generation in the US and many other developed countries, even while real earnings 
for most workers stagnated. Temin looked beyond distribution to consider the evolution 
of the structures of industry and work that generate the disparities.  He adapted a famous 
model developed by W. Arthur Lewis for the analysis of countries in what was then 
known as the Third World and applied it to the contemporary United States. He treated 
the US economy as consisting of two sectors. The first, the “primary” or “core” sector, 
embraces about “thirty percent of the population” (Temin, 2015) (Temin, 2016).  It is 
dominated by finance, technology, and electronics (FTE, in Temin’s shorthand) and 
“consists of skilled workers and managers who have college degrees and command good 
and even very high salaries in our technological economy.” The sector includes, in other 
words, the very rich and rapidly shrinking middle classes.  
 The other “secondary” or “peripheral” sector he saw as populated by “low-skilled 
workers who are suffering the ills of globalization in its various aspects.” He often refers 
to this other part of the economy as the “low-wage sector,” and highlights the role of 
politics and technology in reducing the demand for semi-skilled workers (Temin, 2015). 
Temin treats education as a source of both human capital in a Neoclassical sense, 
but also (along with families and neighborhoods) “social” capital. He views education as 
the passport that allows its holder to transit from one sector to the other. 
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Refreshingly, Temin flatly rejects median voter models of the political system and 
accepts the investment approach to analyzing politics. He notes that primary sector 
workers, especially the very richest Americans whose income has grown the most, now 
champion low taxes. The resulting dismantling of public education and attack on the 
welfare state relies heavily on racial politics for political cover. The result is that chances 
are vanishing for most Americans of any race to enjoy a middle class standard of living.  
Servaas Storm arrives at broadly similar views by a different path. He examines 
how bad macroeconomic policy – the unwillingness in the 1980s and after to pursue 
Keynesian policies of full employment – paved the way for the tendency for dual 
economies to develop not just in the US, but plant roots in economies all over the 
developed world. Storm is highly critical of mainstream macroeconomists for failing to 
recognize that their measures of potential output (used to define “full” employment) fail 
to reflect the true extent of the shortfall in aggregate demand because they simply track 
actual output with lags. Lower demand reduces income, which soon leads to lower 
estimates of potential output (Storm, 2017).43  
Prolonged demand weakness, Storm argues, is more than many enterprises can 
resist. It tempts them to rely on low wage labor. This depresses measured productivity in 
many sectors in which it formerly grew, consigning productivity increases to a handful of 
industry branches in which rapid technological change dominates.  Storm traces how over 
time many workers are steadily pushed out of the primary sector into the low wage 
sector. The stream of workers into the low wage sector accelerates the fall in sectoral 
productivity: Turnover is too high for many workers to sensibly invest in firm-specific 
skills and if there is any incentive for them to learn anything, it is mostly general skills 
that will make them attractive to the next employer, whom they can be sure they will 
soon be encountering. 
 Like Temin, Storm does not see the flow of workers out of the primary into the 
low wage sector as arising from a single factor. The flow varies by context, driven 
alternately by foreign trade, technological change, immigration, foreign direct 
investment, labor market regulation, and attacks on trade unions, as well as the business 
cycle. 
 Two other analysts do not couch their analyses explicitly in terms of a dual 
economy, but describe economic processes that are plainly integral to its workings. 
William Lazonick has shown how the rise of start up firms like Cisco and Microsoft 
propelled sweeping changes in the structure of American business. These boisterous 
infants of the “New Economy” faced the problem of attracting personnel with the right 
mix of technical knowledge and skills. Managers and technical workers in older firms 
could reasonably look forward to rewarding careers inside one firm. To encourage 
workers to move, the New Economy firms offered stock options on a vast scale 
(Lazonick, 2009) (Lazonick, 2017) (Lazonick, 2016). 
For New Economy firms the stock market was vital, both as a way for venture 
capital to exit and take profits and as a way to confer value on the stock options, not as a 
source of initial funding. But the spectacle of financiers and managers becoming mega-
rich almost overnight turned heads in the rest of the corporate economy. With Drexel 
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Burnham Lambert promoting leveraged buyouts via the junk bond revolution and thus 
upending Wall Street’s traditional relations with industry, top managements of older 
firms found the new ideology of shareholder value irresistible. They piled on stock 
options for themselves and dismantled older career ladders that provided scaffolding for 
long term commitments to the firm by workers and managers. They cut back on R&D 
and other overhead expenses that only made sense for firms intent on producing a new 
generation of innovative products and concentrated instead on getting their stock prices 
up. Firms increasingly used their internal funds to buy back their stock instead of making 
continuing investments in their products and processes. Stock buybacks were a crucial 
factor in the stupendous rise of top management compensation relative to average 
workers rewards. In certain crucial sectors such as pharmaceuticals and electronics, firms 
often sustain themselves by appropriating technologies and inventions developed in 
government supported laboratories (typically at nominal costs) and gobbling up smaller 
competitors (Lazonick, 2009) (Lazonick, 2016).  
Older notions of a career spent mostly inside one firm become increasingly 
obsolescent for many other workers besides managers, technical personnel, and scientists. 
But not because they were all luxuriating in stock options. David Weil has demonstrated 
in painstaking detail that as top managers of large firms ladled out stock options to 
themselves, they also reorganized their production processes by contracting out more and 
more labor – a strategy that allowed them not only to reduce the wages and benefits of 
ordinary workers they retained, but remove themselves from legal responsibility for 
monitoring how their lower wage client firms treated their workers. This strategy of 
“fissuring” the workforce led to enormous reductions in the number of permanent 
workers in primary sector firms and swelled the number of jobs in the low wage sector. 
As Weil shows in an especially perceptive discussion, the process creates powerful 
incentives for low margin firms under pressure in the low wage sector to skirt laws on 
wages and hours, including the theft of employee wages. Large firms can then plead that 
any resulting legal problems are the responsibility of the contractors, not them, and point 
to economic theories that claim that wage theft cannot be a viable long term business 
model as proof they can’t be pursuing such a strategy (Weil, 2017).    
        
11. Why Upheaval in 2016?  
This in broad outline is how the dual economy has developed over several 
decades in the United States. But if one accepts the reality of structural changes of this 
sort, then an obvious question requires an answer: How does a long term process 
suddenly come to figure so dramatically in the recent election? 
  Part of the answer is implicit in the earlier discussion of 2014: we do not believe 
that the upheavals of 2016 marked the first time the dual economy affected US elections.  
Though we cannot fully discuss the issue here, we are confident that a close study of 
recent elections would reveal traces of the dual economy’s influence, sometimes in ways 
that are not so obvious as in 2014. But our basic answer is that the 2016 eruptions 
constitute a tipping point – a moment when the many pressures that had been squeezing 
voters for a long time cumulated to a point where, quite literally, daily existence for many 
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had become close to unlivable. There is strong evidence that many citizens were 
searching desperately for ways out of what looked (and in fact are) dead-end situations. 
Many rebelled as they listened to commentators tell them that the US economy was really 
doing better than it had in many years and that they should be celebrating America’s exit 
from the Great Recession. They were unmoved by the chorus of conventional politicians 
trying to sell old nostrums that by 2014 were plainly obsolete for them in their 
communities. Empty slogans no longer appealed, they just disgusted or enraged. When 
two politicians broke through the big money cartels that dominate both major parties, 
popular enthusiasm surged almost overnight to seismic levels, shocking elites in both 
parties and flummoxing the entire American establishment.  
 With the same caution as before – that we have room here only for sketches – let 
us briefly consider how the dual economy weighed down so many Americans, making 
them desperate for relief.  
 First, there is the obvious: the grinding reality of continuous, unyielding low pay 
over many years that Storm, Temin, and other analysts place at the center of their 
analyses. By 2016, this had been going on for a full generation. For workers in the low 
wage sector, chances of sustained improvements in well being were remote – roughly 
comparable to the odds of winning one of the lotteries that have spread like a flu virus 
through fiscally pressed states. This put many stresses placed on workers are impossible 
to inventory here. But we would single out the record over time of children living at or 
near poverty levels. This is almost beyond belief and characterized by especially 
grotesque racial and ethnic disparities.44  
Assessing the discontent of different groups of workers is difficult, because few 
reliable behavioral statistical indicators exist. Strike levels, for example, have been low 
for decades. That, however, is likely a result of the costs of mounting strikes and the 
dismal prospects for success. In a world in which capital is far more mobile than workers, 
and where employers are routinely able to violate labor laws with impunity, corporate 
America is simply too strong. The fatal weakness of “exit, voice, and loyalty” models – 
that they do not incorporate an explicit cost function – are visible here for all to behold 
(Hirschman, 1970). The same holds for measures of labor union strength. They have been 
in steady decline in the US and many other developed countries for many years.45 An 
interesting indicator suggestive of a possible tipping point, however, may be the 
expressed interest in minimum wages. Agitation for minimum wage increases, of course, 
reflects not only bottom up dissatisfaction but specific support from various activist and 
elite philanthropic organizations along with policymaking circles concerned about social 
unrest. Still, it is striking that a Google Trends analysis for the US shows steadily rising 
interest in minimum wages. This is likely related to the waves of protest about inequality 
that have broken out worldwide since the Occupy movement exploded into the headlines 
in 2011, (with, like the minimum wage discussion, important early encouragement from 
more liberal policymakers and business groups (Ferguson, 2014b)). 
 In the U.S., however, indices pointing to literally unendurable situations have 
been flashing red for almost two decades. Recently, as some have exploded, they have 
finally attracted attention.. The best known studies are those of Anne Case and Angus 
Deaton. Their basic argument is that “after decades of improvement, all-cause mortality 
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rates among white Non-Hispanic men and women in middle age stopped falling in the US 
and began to rise.”  Although “mid-life mortality continued to fall in other rich countries, 
and in other racial and ethnic groups in the United States, white Non-Hispanic mortality 
rates for those aged 45-54 increased from 1998 to 2013”. (Case and Deaton, 2017). 
 This rise in mortality, which contrasts so glaringly with patterns in other wealthy 
countries and inevitably brings to mind comparisons with the former Soviet Union, 
chiefly affects white workers and their spouses with low levels of education and wages. 
In their efforts to frame explanations, Case and Deaton caution that “we are still far from 
a smoking gun or a fully developed model.” But they propose a “preliminary but 
plausible story” of how “cumulative disadvantage over life, in the labor market, in 
marriage and child outcomes, and in health, is triggered by progressively worsening labor 
market opportunities at the time of entry for whites with low levels of education” (Case 
and Deaton, 2017). Shannon Monnat and other researchers, including Case and Deaton in 
their recent work, have explored how experiences of persisting pain has contributed to the 
wave of opioid use roiling so many communities in recent years (Monnat and Brown, 
2017). 
 Everyone studying these matters recognizes that no one sort of locale has a 
monopoly on these dismal conditions. They are found everywhere, if one looks, from 
large cities to rural hamlets. But Monnat and others have drawn attention to the role place 
plays in the process.  
A growing literature in mainstream economics and urban studies celebrates the 
role cities and especially “world cities” are said to play in stimulating economic growth 
in the age of globalization (Glaeser, 2011). But the United States and many other 
countries are today dotted with ruins of once-great industrial or mining areas that have 
never recovered from hammerings they received from the flood of competing imports or 
the relocation of their production centers that also followed from economic globalization. 
For all the brave talk by mainstream economists, foundations, and politicians about 
“Pareto improvements,” “comparative advantage,” and the “income-augmenting” role of 
international trade, in many places economic activity has never recovered. (Autor et al., 
2016). Older mining and industrial plants stretch like Halloween skeletons over desolate, 
slowly depopulating landscapes. Younger people leave for cities, as aging residents, with 
little prospects in the New Economy, struggle to get by on disability or Social Security, 
as they or their children often turn to opioids and other drugs. 
 In the US, the collapse of the housing bubble compounded these problems; home 
values in many of these communities left behind have not recovered, leaving individual 
home owners – those who still have their dwellings, that is – close to underwater or 
actually insolvent (Zonta et al., 2016). We note, grimly, that surveys that track only 
incomes miss much of the action that matters here, which concerns liabilities as much as 
assets.46 And we are not surprised that economically sensitive analysts who take the time 
to sort out effects by place find that big surges in imports, such as those that hit both 
Germany and the United States in the last generation, led to striking political changes 
(Autor et al., 2016) (Autor et al., 2017) (Dippel et al., 2015). We think it is inevitable that 
citizens living for long periods in immobile economic and social circumstances will 
increasingly find that large chunks of the “common sense” of other, more globally 
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oriented parts of the country grate on them, and indeed, come to seem almost 
meaningless or downright perverse. The realities of life in the contrasting prosperous 
areas – which scatter across individual countries like islands in archipelagos, not giant 
territorial blocks, diverge too much. Behind all the talk of increasing demographic 
division in the US, in other words, we suspect are some real but less-mentioned divisions 
by place that provide the raw material with which demagogues and politically oriented 
commentaries go to work. The tendency toward growing isolation, (thanks to sheer facts 
of income imbalances and a rapidly differentiating media environment), plus some hard 
work and a lot of money can make it seem as though each side lives in a bubble, because 
they do.  
But alas, the miserable incomes and precarious life conditions that dual 
economies generate for more and more citizens define only part of the problem. The 
thousand natural shocks that workers in the low wage sector are heir to are multiplied 
many times by the decay of educational opportunities and the welfare state. 
 Let us start with education, which, as Temin observes, is the royal road to the 
middle class, if hardly the 1%. As he shows, the incessant drumbeat for lower taxes, 
which echoed in both (investor-driven) parties since the mid-1970s, led to drastic 
declines in funding for public education. Many state university systems today have 
withered away to an astonishing extent. Often state support provides a third or less of 
total revenues. Public K-12 education has been hammered in virtually all major cities 
and, increasingly, even in suburbs. 
The collapse of state support closes off college to many low-income students. 
That is terrible and demoralizing in itself. But the mixed public and private US system 
has come up with a partial solution that is uniquely pathological: it struggles to make up 
the public shortfall by encouraging massive private borrowing (Cillufo, 2017). There is 
little doubt that investment in education has high social rates of return. The social rate of 
return on government grants and lending at low rates to students who can do the work 
should therefore be high (with one qualification noted below.) Instead, most Republicans 
and some Democrats – encouraged by handsome campaign contributions from private 
lenders – have done their best to bottle up governments at all levels from acting.(Swann, 
2017) This forces many students to turn to private financiers, who often lend at double 
digit rates or higher, even after the 2008 crash when interest rates fell to historically low 
levels. The hideous practice of students trying desperately to mortgage streams of their 
future income to individual private lenders – a modern form of debt peonage – is now 
appearing, as trapped would be borrowers desperately seek escape from dead end jobs in 
the low wage sector.  
 The mountain of student debt that has built up now competes with credit card and 
auto debt and ranks respectably even against housing debt.47 Since the Great Recession, 
however, a more subtle and deadly effect has appeared.. In part this arises from the 
austerity policies that nearly all major developed countries have pursued since the 2008 
collapse. But a portion of it is a direct consequence of the growth of the dual economy 
that the mainstream literature has yet to spotlight: The primary sector cannot shrink 
consistently over time, without impacting the demand for professionals and trained 
personnel. A widening dual economy, that is, implies a slowly building crisis in the 
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professions and managerial and technical training as students come out the other end of 
the education system and find the pool of available positions constrained.  
This problem – which is separate from, but in practice compounded by, offshoring 
of middle class work made possible by improvements in telecommunications – shows up 
in many countries besides the United States. As so often, however, the incentives for 
individual institutions in the sprawling US system make everything worse: institutions, 
public and private, use every means at their disposal to herd paying students through. 
Many lower their standards and encourage students to borrow. The result, increasingly, is 
a race to the bottom, a macabre confirmation of convergence of developed economies 
with many developing countries that inspired the Lewis model: a proliferation of 
increasingly meaningless degrees whose holders emerge with heavy debts but only 
remote prospects for middle class positions. 
The tendency to try to use private debt to plug holes in individual lives left by the 
retraction of a desperately squeezed public sector produces many other pathologies. One 
is particularly important: health care. 
The basic problem of the U.S. medical care system – its fabulous costs and wretched 
outcomes relative to health care in most of the rest of the world (including all of the 
developed world) is well documented (Ferguson and Johnson, 2011). The Obama 
administration’s Affordable Care Act brought some real improvements, but it did not 
solve the most basic problem facing average citizens: that serious medical problems 
capable of bankrupting them can strike almost anyone, anytime, even high up in the 
middle class. Too many issues with coverage and charges, especially so-called “balance 
billing,” were left unresolved. The Affordable Care Act also did not go very far to 
actually make medical care affordable; large numbers of American are forced to go 
without food or medicines that they need, especially when they are sick, and the public 
demand for limits on the costs of medical care is strong (DiJulio et al., 2017). For 
political reasons, the Obama administration, the Clinton campaign, and a vast number of 
allied analysts sought to downplay the harsh realities during the 2016 election, but on one 
occasion in early October, Bill Clinton slipped off message. To the consternation of the 
campaign (which immediately muzzled him), he told the truth: “You’ve got this crazy 
system where all of a sudden 25 million more people have health care and then the people 
who are out there busting it, sometimes 60 hours a week, wind up with their premiums 
doubled and their coverage cut in half…It’s the craziest thing in the world”.(Allen and 
Parnes, 2017). 
In the money-driven US political system, regulatory policy rarely helps ordinary 
Americans, as millions of homeowners bitterly discovered when the housing bubble 
burst. In the long run up to the financial crisis, major financial regulators like the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and 
the Federal Reserve – not to mention the Treasury – acted like textbook examples of 
industry-captured vehicles. Before the crash, only one state attorney general – Eliot 
Spitzer – ever mounted a challenge with real teeth, while isolated activist regulators, 
notably Brooksley Born, were rolled by the massive weight of industry political power 
(Epstein and Montecino, 2016) (Ferguson and Johnson, 2009a) (Ferguson and Johnson, 
2009b). After the crash, no major financiers went to jail, while first the Republicans and 
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then the Democrats bailed out Wall Street but not Main Street. Citibank and other 
institutions kept piling on leverage and thinning out their capital but then were rescued, 
while losses to pensions and housing values of ordinary Americans were never made 
good – as many Americans certainly still recalled in 2016. Monopolistic practices in 
telecommunications cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars, with (at best) mild 
checks – no matter which party is in power, thanks in major share to the power of 
political money (Cooper, 2016) (Ferguson et al., 2017). No regulator does much to 
protect consumer privacy. Virtually the only thing one can trust about anti-trust policies 
is that authorities in charge are far more likely to have qualms about, say, cement 
companies than real giants whose charges for cable or wireless service come almost 
miraculously close to each other.   
 
12. Republican Orthodoxy is Disrupted       
 As the presidential race began in earnest in 2015, the chances of any candidate 
seriously addressing the issues thrown up by the dual economy looked slim indeed. Most 
observers expected a rerun of a movie everyone had seen before: a battle between 
representatives of the two political dynasties that had dominated American public life for 
most of the period in which the dual economy took root: The Bush and Clinton families.  
 That prospect turned off an indefinite number of Republicans, especially 
conservatives. It also gave rise to a whispering campaign that occasionally broke into the 
open suggesting that Jeb Bush might really be a much weaker candidate than his 
predecessors and could be vulnerable. But at the outset the shape of the political coalition 
that seemed destined to dominate looked set. It was a twenty-first century version of the 
older Republican establishment bloc dominated by multinational finance, oil, and other 
globally oriented industries that had carried two earlier Bushes to victory (Ferguson and 
Rogers, 1986) (Ferguson, 2005).48 In such an alignment it was foreseeable – and actually 
did happen – that as the campaign started, Jeb Bush would unveil a gigantic war chest 
that was plainly designed to overawe both the media and any challengers who might be 
tempted to critically evaluate his proposals and past record.  
 The next step in the grand design would then be a series of debates as highly 
choreographed as a Japanese tea ceremony. Endorsements and accolades from party 
leaders would cascade down on the Anointed One, along with yet more money. 
According to a popular academic theory of nominations (one that we have never 
embraced, since it fails to recognize the critical role of political money, both direct and 
indirect) the resulting consensus of party leaders would make Bush’s triumph 
inevitable.49  
As Bush and the doomed also-rans slogged through the primaries, it could be 
confidently forecast that the range of issues they would discuss would be astonishingly 
narrow. To many spectators the truncated range would sound eerie, as though everyone 
on stage in the debates was in the iron grip of some powerful force blocking normal 
human speech. This, of course, was because they were: The investment approach to party 
competition emphasizes the decisive role of political money in conditioning political 
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appeals. No matter how many Americans want to preserve Social Security, pursue 
economic policies that target rising wages, or close off the possibility of personal 
bankruptcy due to medical expenses (to take three issues on which the direction of public 
opinion even in many Republican primaries is fairly clear) only appeals that can be 
financed have any prospect of making it into the political arena (Ferguson, 1995a). 
From this standpoint, candidates’ messages in the Republican Party were almost 
as predictable as eclipses. You just needed to put them in the context of their donor 
base(s). This major media sites that reveled in complex voting statistics somehow never 
managed to do. 
In Bush’s case, everyone knew what he stood for before he said it, indeed, even if 
he sometimes hesitated to say it, out of calculated discretion. He, like his father and 
brother, favored free trade, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership; multilateralism; the 
traditional structure of U.S. alliances; close relations with both Israel and Saudi Arabia; a 
huge worldwide military; and all the wars waged during the various Bush presidencies. 
He did not like Iran, but his criticisms of the nuclear accord negotiated by Obama were 
formal and not entirely credible. The best guess was that James A. Baker, who had served 
his father and rescued his brother in the Florida imbroglio, and other like-minded 
establishment types, would prevail when push came to shove. A Bush administration 
would find some way to live with the deal, which even Baker was on record as half-
heartedly opposing. 
On Ukraine, Syria, and other issues, Bush would be dependably anti-Russian 
without being hyper-shrill. Like the rest of his family, he believed close relations with 
China were vital to preserving world order, while also being completely committed to 
maintaining the American Seventh Fleet as a bedrock of the American alliances with 
Australia, Japan, and – very carefully – Taiwan. He opposed Obamacare and network 
neutrality, both red lines for Republicans, and claimed to be suspicious of climate change, 
though many in the GOP suspected he might be more flexible on the last. Virtually 
everyone realized that, like his brother George W., he really would like to trim Social 
Security and replace it with private investment schemes administered by Wall Street, but 
the logic of not making a big point of that in the campaign was apparent. Of course he 
could be relied upon to cut taxes yet again and further deregulate industry. 
Those positions dovetailed with the mammoth business coalition that enlisted 
behind Bush. Table 4 breaks out the financing for all Republican primary candidates in 
terms of industries (including Trump up to May 4, when Ted Cruz, his last serious 
challenger, withdrew following a disastrous loss in the Indiana primary).50 The Bush bloc 
was anchored in multinational banking and finance, with strong representation – meaning 
hundreds of thousands of dollars raised – from all major banks, many private equity and 
hedge funds, insurance companies, and other financial houses.51 But the coalition also 
embraced many sectors with historical ties to the Bush family, including oil and chemical 
companies of all sizes, along with firms and investors in coal, mining, paper, and other 
sectors that have traditionally battled regulations designed to limit the dangers of climate 
change (Ferguson et al., 2013). Big firms in telecommunications, notably the descendants 
of the old Bell operating companies and major cable firms providing access to consumers 
that strongly oppose network neutrality (since they run the networks that the measure 
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would crimp) were also heavily represented.52 Transportation, Big Pharma, and the entire 
private health care industry, including insurers, were also abundantly present. It looked 
like the Golden Horde was reincarnating, just like in the old days – almost. 
 
Table 4 About Here 
 
 
A business base of such dimensions of course complicated all mass appeals. 
Many measures the coalition supported, such as the trade deals, were very unpopular. The 
Party also represented employers first and foremost; neither in its higher nor its lower 
circles was there any space whatever for unions or, typically, even minimum wages, a 
measure intensely disliked by most smaller firms in the low-wage sector. The question of 
how the Republicans could appeal to blue- or grey-collar workers was thus highly 
fraught. The party had been grappling with this problem for more than a generation, 
especially since its discovery in the Goldwater campaign of 1964 that free markets roused 
little mass enthusiasm, but appeals on crime and moral decay did resonate (Phillips-Fein, 
2009) (Ferguson, 1995a) (Ferguson and Rogers, 1986) 
By 2015, the laboriously erected scaffolding that connected the Republican 
establishment with the specialized segments of the wider public that the party had any 
chance of attracting on these grounds had grown thin indeed. As a former governor of 
Florida, married to the Mexican-American daughter of a migrant worker, Bush was adept 
at picking his way along that tricky path. He was opposed to abortion, though not 
aggressively promoting still more restrictive legislation. True believers suspected he 
would, like his father and brother, sell them out once in power. The former governor 
professed to consider hunting sacrosanct and opposed gun control. Where he stepped 
most tentatively and carefully was on immigration. He radiated confidence that 
immigration was a good thing and indicated that he might be open to some kind of grand 
bargain on immigrants and “Dreamers,” (the children of illegal immigrants born in the 
United States, who in many cases knew no other country) though this came steel-encased 
in rhetoric about border security. 
The strategies of the other contenders for the nomination – all but one -- are also 
easy to understand in light of Table 4. They faced the challenge of attracting enormous 
sums of money from a potential donor base that heavily overlapped Bush’s. As Table 2 
showed, save for the candidates appealing directly to evangelicals – Carson, Huckabee, 
and (with some major qualifications) Cruz and Fiorina – and the special case of Rand 
Paul, all the candidates depended heavily on contributions of a thousand dollars or more. 
The plain fact, however, was that appealing only to small donors in a Republican primary 
was akin to trying to paddle a canoe in the face of an oncoming tidal wave. Many 
candidates, unsurprisingly, appear to have made virtually no appeal to small donors. They 
floated mainly on contributions above $10,000, as Table 4 indicates. But no matter where 
candidates beat the bushes for money, this was a Republican primary. No one who hoped 
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to attract big business support could reasonably expect to succeed who did not walk in 
lockstep with most of the cardinal tenets of the Bush campaign: free trade, 
multilateralism, vast spending on defense, endless wars, etc.  
In all likelihood, a substantial number of the minor candidates who threw their 
hats into the ring, including Huckabee, Gilmore, Pataki, and Jindal really aspired to 
cabinet positions or slots on the Fox Network. Christie, Fiorina, and Rubio were likely 
running for Vice President. They and any others who entertained hope that lightening 
would strike if Bush stumbled could be sure that their chances would not be enhanced by 
bolting from Republican orthodoxy, especially on the urgency of cutting taxes.   
The likely also-rans thus pursued strategies that strikingly resembled canonical 
models of imperfect competition in microeconomics. They first hit up such patrons as 
they had developed and interests they knew from their days in power. Though we lack the 
space to detail individual cases, such contributions figure among the large donations to 
most of the various campaigns. It is tempting to describe these top-heavy patterns as 
industrial versions of the “friends and neighbors” voting much studied by electoral 
analysts. Fiorina’s case is particularly clear cut, as she had headed up a major 
telecommunications company, but several of the governors also provided obvious 
examples. From their various bases, each candidate then experimented with offering 
slightly differentiated versions of essentially the same product as Bush, adding bells and 
whistles that might appeal to different audiences of investors and different segments of 
the likely Republican electorate. Then they hoped for the best. 
All the contenders, for example, claimed they were pro-life, including several 
who had to clumsily walk back past positions that were less intransigent. Many 
candidates added wrinkles to the basic “no”: they staked out more extreme positions on 
modifying existing laws to make abortions even harder to obtain or to throw still more 
roadblocks in the way of Planned Parenthood. Carly Fiorina directly promoted 
overturning Roe vs. Wade; others pushed limiting abortions after 20 weeks, etc. Almost 
everyone professed to doubt that human activity affected climate change, though Fiorina 
at times made noises that humans might actually affect the climate but that governments 
could not do anything about it. No one apart from Bush made many friendly gestures to 
Muslims. Neither did anyone speak up for network neutrality, which would have been 
anathema to the telcos.  
Marco Rubio and Carly Fiorina both aspired to the multinational mainstream on 
economics – Fiorina had run Hewlett Packard – but they competed to see who could be 
more convincingly bellicose toward Iran and Russia. The ranks of their donors reflected 
these moves, along with their local economic bases. Rubio resembled a rightward tilting 
Bush and garnered wide support from various multinational banks and industrial firms. 
But his vehement pose on Iran drew proportionately heavier applause from outspoken 
critics of establishment foreign policy, such as the financier Paul Singer (who had for 
some years helped subsidize an alternative foreign policy forum), prominent defense 
contractors, some oil companies, Neoconservative critics of Obama’s policies in eastern 
Europe and the Middle East, and American champions of the Likkud Party’s 
interpretation of Israeli interests. Fiorina, along with Scott Walker (the Governor of 
Wisconsin) proposed arming Ukrainians resisting the Russian supported separatists with 
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advanced weapons. She also cheered the idea of increasing the number of American 
troops in Europe.  
Other candidates pursued different niches. Ted Cruz’s main appeal was as 
defender of Libertarianism who detested government and taxes and strongly promoted 
free trade, but whose father had converted from Roman Catholicism to become an 
evangelical preacher. He experimented with some low key criticisms of China, which 
was just then emerging as a larger problem for US firms operating there and for Silicon 
Valley enterprises increasingly alarmed by what might be termed the “supply side 
mercantilism” that the Chinese government practices in favor of its indigenous industries 
in high tech and other advanced sectors. A graduate of Princeton and Harvard Law, 
whose wife worked for Goldman Sachs, Cruz also garnered some contributions from 
Wall Street and from oil companies in and around his own state of Texas.  
Chris Christie, Governor of New Jersey, received over a quarter of a million 
dollars from executives of Public Service Electric and Gas, the giant utility that that sells 
in much of his state. Then he struck off boldly (“courageously” as many newspaper 
accounts styled it) in a different direction. He promised to trim Social Security and cut 
“entitlements” as legions of tax-averse investors in both political parties have incessantly 
demanded. This brought him substantial contributions from Wall Street hedge fund 
managers and investors, accounting executives, and a fairly broad cross-section of mostly 
eastern-centered large firms, including some who were outspoken proponents of cutting 
entitlements. His was a campaign that relied especially heavily on truly large 
contributions. 
So it was that in the very earliest days of the race, the script appeared to be 
holding up. Money rained down on Bush.  The rest of the field gasped for air (money) 
and plugged away to differentiate themselves enough to reach the minimum poll levels 
they knew sponsors of the Republican debates would require. 
On June 16, 2015, something took place that was not in the script. A member of 
the Forbes 400, whose reality TV show had made him a household name to millions of 
Americans, announced that he was joining the race. Unlike the other candidates, he did 
not have to think a long time to find a suitably impressive location to kick off his 
campaign. He simply walked down a staircase in the high tower in New York City that 
bore his name and met the press.  
That Donald Trump might jump into the race had been rumored for a while; it 
was an open secret that he had toyed with the idea several times before. For more than 
four years, he had been fanning suspicions about where President Obama was really born 
and whether he was a closet Muslim. But the political establishment had always scorned 
Trump, and refused to take him seriously this time, either. The idea that he would run for 
president excited more laughter than anything else (Green, 2017) (Blair, 2015) (Kranish 
and Fisher, 2016).   
But the apparently off-the-cuff remarks that he made at that announcement 
resounded like thunder across the United States and in Mexico: "When Mexico sends its 
people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. 
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They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems 
with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I 
assume, are good people" (Staff, 2016). On the heels of his announcement Trump gave an 
exclusive interview to a Breitbart News reporter, so that the vast network built up by 
Steve Bannon and the Mercers could not miss the message.  
His promise to build a wall along the border horrified Republican elites, who after 
the 2012 election had sought to repair the Party’s relations with Latinos. It also appalled 
millions of Americans who considered it out-and-out racism. But after Trump flew to 
Laredo, Texas, in July, ostensibly in response to an invitation from a local of the Border 
Patrol union and promised both a Wall and jobs as part of his program to “Make America 
Great Again,” he shot up in the polls.53 
Republican primary voters are anything but random samples of the American 
electorate. They are considerably older, richer, whiter, and far more conservative than the 
general electorate (Ferguson and Page, 2017)..Trump’s presence rather clearly spurred 
turnouts, but they remained very small in absolute size – about 17% of the total potential 
electorate in both parties (Desilver, 2016). In a field with more than a dozen candidates, 
Trump’s usual, but not invariable, pole position for much of the race was an enormous 
strategic advantage. It meant that Bush and the rest of the field had to battle each other to 
stay in the debates while trying to keep up with him.  
Later, as the dazed Republican establishment licked its wounds and sought to 
come to terms with what was happening to it, the legend grew up that Trump’s triumph 
really showed that money didn’t really matter in politics. Trump won, the argument went, 
because of all the free publicity the mass media afforded him. We have more to say about 
that subject below, when we analyze the crises that threatened Trump’s campaign in the 
late summer of 2016. But for now there is a simple response. Yes, Donald Trump was 
well-known from his television show. But what gave him the freedom to jump into the 
race and trash-talk the other candidates into oblivion was the fact that he was a 
billionaire. He didn’t need the money of the Bush Golden Horde or the many 1-percent 
fans of Marco Rubio, Scott Walker, and the rest. Or the Kochs. Or the defense and 
aerospace industry. 
In a normal election year, anyone who talked like Trump in the GOP primaries 
might hope to shuttle around some early small states and make a brief splash, before 
being swamped by a wall of money in big multi-state primaries on some Super Tuesday 
later in the campaign.  
Not Trump — he was never going to run out of money in the primary as long as 
he was willing to open his own wallet, and everyone knew it. His money gave him both 
the means and the confidence to break the donors’ cartel that until then had eliminated all 
GOP candidates who didn’t begin by saluting the Bush family for starting the Iraq War, 
incessantly demanding cuts in Social Security and Medicare, and managing the economy 
into total collapse via financial deregulation. He could even mock the carried-interest tax 
loophole and sneer at Wall Street. He could say whatever he wanted as he flashed around 
in his own private jet with an almost presidential entourage of guards, schedulers, and 
advisers that other campaigns had to pay dearly for. He could make charitable 
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contributions to veterans’ organizations and other groups whose timely support could be 
helpful and which would not show up in any campaign finance tabulation. And anyone 
who did a favor for his campaign could be confident they were helping someone who 
would be around for a long time, no matter how the campaign turned out – indeed 
someone who seemed intent on setting up some kind of a network or mass movement if 
somehow he didn’t win (Barajas, 2016). 
The effect of Trump’s freedom to talk, along with the apparent credibility his 
membership on the Forbes list conferred on him when he talked about jobs and foreign 
trade, and his attacks on immigrants, highly publicized quarrels with women political 
commentators, and demands for “America First” in foreign policy was electrifying – like 
throwing open a tomb that had been sealed for ages. Next to the struggling wraiths who 
toiled in the Republican primary, he looked like Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, who “doth 
bestride the narrow world like a colossus.” The political establishment couldn’t 
comprehend what was happening, or why even people suspicious of him couldn’t take 
their eyes off him. Trump just laughed at the other candidates’ shibboleths and their 
stuttering incapacity to say anything to any real person or address the issues pressing so 
hard on Americans living in a dual economy.  
In analyzing the Trump vote, the published exit polls conducted by media 
consortia are only modestly helpful. Their displays include only a few controls. The 
American National Election Survey data can be much more useful, if carefully done.   
Because of the importance of the spatial inequalities that the dual economy produces, for 
example, we suspect that normal controls for income are less useful than in the past. The 
key issue is likely long-term stagnation in places where respondents live, which year-to-
year measures will not catch. One should be cautious, therefore, in pointing to voting data 
from the 2016 election. Still it is striking that in the Republican primaries, early analyses 
suggest that Trump ran especially well in counties with heavy concentrations of poor 
whites who had relatively low levels of education – exactly what one would expect from 
the earlier analysis of the dual economy (Guo, 2016).  The pull of the promise of “making 
America great again” was intense: Even in Iowa, where Trump narrowly lost, 
evangelicals, presumably one of the last groups one would expect to be attracted to a 
loose-talking and loose-living figure like Trump, deserted their pastors in substantial 
numbers. As the Republican campaign wore on, the flow turned into a torrent, leaving 
Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and other candidates who courted the evangelicals out in right 
field.  
 
13. The Democratic Earthquake 
On the Democratic side, just like the Republicans,’ a consensus script existed for 
the primaries. The Democratic counterpart to Jeb Bush was Hillary Clinton, who was 
supposed to cruise more or less effortlessly to the nomination. As a lawyer with a 
distinguished career in her own right, a very involved First Lady, U.S. Senator, and then 
Secretary of State under President Obama, she could hardly be faulted for lack of 
experience or credentials. The prospect of becoming the first woman President lent her 
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candidacy an extra layer of dignity and importance, though, obviously, it also stimulated 
various attacks that in many cases were less than good-willed or even in good faith. 
 Not everyone, however, was entranced by all parts of her record. It was no secret 
that Hillary had played an active-behind-the scenes role in her husband’s presidency. Bill 
Clinton’s enthusiasm for financial deregulation was well known; it was during his 
presidency that milestone deregulatory legislation had been enacted, such as the final 
abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act that used to separate investment banking from 
commercial banking. Many of the biggest battles in the long fight by the banks to keep 
derivatives from being regulated had also taken place during his administration, with 
Robert Rubin, Lawrence Summers, and other key Clinton appointees (together with some 
Republicans like Phil and Wendy Gramm) driving that policy as both Clintons looked on 
benignly.  
Hillary Clinton’s record as Senator from New York in regard to financial 
deregulation was consistent with this arc. Before the collapse in 2008, she lagged far 
behind many other Democrats in efforts to restrain Wall Street (Linskey, 2016). After 
staunchly supporting the key free trade initiatives of her husband, including the landmark 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), she hewed to the same line in the 
Senate. Records disclosed during the 2016 campaign showed that as Secretary of State 
Clinton enthusiastically supported the Trans-Pacific Partnership that the Obama 
administration hoped to push across. Only after leaving office did she finally come out 
against the TPP during the campaign (Allen and Parnes, 2017).  
As Secretary of State Clinton had worked closely with many big American firms, 
especially Google, which promoted a global vision of countries linked by worldwide 
telecommunications markets dominated by lightly regulated giants like themselves 
(Assange, 2014). In Asia, this support for free trade came accompanied by a hawkish 
stance toward China. It was during her tenure as Secretary of State that one of her 
subordinates discovered that the US mutual defense treaty with Japan covered an island 
that the US officially was not sure even belonged to Japan.  
Like Bill Clinton in the nineties, Hillary Clinton also strongly promoted NATO 
expansion. In 2008, as a Senator, she had cosponsored a resolution to bring both Georgia 
and Ukraine into NATO, which was guaranteed to produce in Russia roughly the same 
sensation as a Russian pact with Canada would in the US (Sachs, 2016). She continued 
down this path as Secretary of State. Her Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, played a key role in the US effort to squeeze Ukraine 
into choosing between Europe and Russia (to paraphrase the rueful description by the 
then German Vice Chancellor, after the plan miscarried) (De Ploeg, 2017) (Behrakis, 
2014). Clinton also pushed to challenge the Russian backed regime in Syria and strongly 
promoted changes in Egypt and other Arab regimes, including, most fatefully, Libya. As 
discussed below, a Clinton tilt toward the Neoconservatives became more pronounced as 
she left the administration to prepare for her presidential campaign.  
Years of fending off vitriolic conservative attacks had left the Clintons wary; they 
certainly appreciated the value of institutional resources, including money. But many 
observers, including (as an email disclosed by WikiLeaks revealed) Colin Powell, and 
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some top officials of Hillary Clinton’s own campaign, had qualms about the lengths the 
Clintons were prepared to go to build a war chest (Geller, 2016). The Clinton 
Foundation’s pursuit of donations from regimes in central Asia and the Persian Gulf that 
were anything but models of democracy attracted attention, especially when clumsy 
efforts to conceal them through screens were exposed. The Washington Post reported that 
between 2001 and 2013, the Clinton Foundation had raised almost $2 billion dollars  
from “a vast global network that includes corporate titans, political donors, foreign 
governments and other wealthy interests” (Helderman et al., 2015). Eventually the 
Foundation and its financing became the target of a book commissioned by Steven 
Bannon in advance of the 2016 election (Schweitzer, 2015). The Foundation, however, 
hardly exhausted the Clinton’s efforts to shake the money tree. CNN reported that 
between February 2001 and May 2015, (when Hillary Clinton declared for the 
presidency) the Clintons had received more than $153 million in speaking fees. Almost 
eight million dollars of that came from just a handful of giant banks, including Goldman 
Sachs, UBS, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Deutsche Bank (Yoon, 2016).  
When queried about all this largesse, Clinton’s answers were often less than 
reassuring. In the campaign she flatly refused to make public the text of speeches she 
made for Goldman Sachs after leaving the Department of State, which was widely 
interpreted as a strong signal to the financial community. At times she challenged 
questioners to name a vote she had switched for money, implicitly dodging questions 
about her long support for policies that 2008 had clearly shown to be disastrous. Asked 
after the campaign had ended why she kept chasing so much money, she dismissed the 
question by responding that the companies paid such fees to men all the time (Marcus, 
2017). In the meantime, money poured into her campaign not only from Wall Street, but 
from a broad cross-section of American big business, as Table 5 shows. 
 
 
Table 5 About Here 
 
 
Neither Martin O’Malley nor James Webb, two hopefuls who also entered the 
race, posed any challenge to Clinton in regard to fundraising or anything else. Like the 
Republican also-rans, each started from a small base of big donors that they then could 
not expand, though Webb – a vaguely populist defense hawk – also attracted some small 
donations. Both quickly dropped out.  
In the face of Bernie Sanders’ onslaught, however, Clinton’s responses to 
questions about her relations to Wall Street looked lame in indeed. Written off as quixotic 
when he announced, Sanders’s meteoric rise stunned everyone. The avowed Socialist 
from Vermont did not rely on the usual coterie of Democratic insiders on corporate and 
foundation retainers for advice on policy and the economy. In sharp contrast to the 
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Clintons, Sanders had long supported labor unions, not simply by talking with (some of) 
their leaders, but actually showing up on picket lines to support campaigns to organize 
workers. Unlike Clinton, who claimed that she went to Iowa to “listen” to voters and 
excelled in spelling out the wonkish details of particular programs, Sanders forthrightly 
addressed the central problems that the dual economy creates for ordinary Americans. 
Unionization was part of his answer to low pay. Increasing aggregate demand by taking 
aggressive action to guarantee full employment and fund major public projects was 
another. In front of millions of people who probably had never heard anyone press such 
issues before, Sanders argued for implementing single-payer health care and getting big 
money out of politics. He also tackled the college debt problem head on, saying that the 
first two years of college should be free and proposed a plan to forgive student debt. 
The response was overwhelming. A genuine mass movement, the Sanders 
campaign followed a wild grass-roots logic of its own that the central staff had no hope of 
fully controlling. The surge unnerved not only the Clinton camp, but the entire American 
establishment. Major media outlets that happily afforded Trump waves of free coverage 
were far more grudging toward Sanders. Many stories in the Washington Post and other 
media did not even attempt to be even-handed, though in the latter stages of the campaign 
his press coverage improved.54 But it didn’t seem to matter. When Sanders responded to 
Clinton in a debate that no one on Wall Street ever offered him six-figure fees for 
speeches one could almost hear the TV audience collectively suck in its breath. Likewise 
when he reminded Clinton of her husband’s role in the financial deregulation that 
destroyed the world economy and reproached Clinton, who claimed to be the experienced 
foreign-policy hand, for simply swimming with the tide in the run-up to the invasion of 
Iraq. While Clinton claimed Henry Kissinger as a mentor and praised his foreign policy 
acumen, Sanders bluntly declared that he was proud to say that Kissinger was not his 
friend and that he would not take advice from him (Harris, 2016).  
Sanders clearly connected with the concerns of many listeners, especially with 
young people. To many in the generations who had grown to maturity after the Cold War, 
Sanders’ proposals sounded like common sense, not pie in the sky. They and millions of 
their elders appreciated his proposals on student debt and his forthright discussion of 
economic inequality, health care, Wall Street, and labor markets. And he waged his 
campaign on a broadly inclusive basis, stigmatizing bankers, not racial, religious, or 
sexual minorities. Most astonishing of all, though, was how Sanders financed his effort. 
This was the real secret of his “revolution”: Money just kept pouring in from small 
contributors. We have checked carefully to see if Sanders, like Obama in both 2008 and 
2012, perhaps received large sums delivered in small doses from big donors (Ferguson et 
al., 2013). He did not. The entries for big business in Table 5 come from scattered small 
contributions from firms where large numbers of individuals contributed. There were 
essentially no big ticket contributions from top executives and, a fortiori, no Super PACs. 
(Younger workers, who in some cases were quite vocal about the absurdly skewed pay 
levels in their industry, show up especially heavily in Silicon Valley and other high tech 
locales.) The handful of relatively large contributions arose from summed donations of a 
few unions (most unions, if much less clearly union members, supported Clinton).55 
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The Clinton campaign had always believed that her long time ties to the Black 
community would tide her through any rough patches (Allen and Parnes, 2017). Although 
by the end of the race young African Americans were coming over to Sanders in 
substantial numbers, that calculation was basically right. Sanders kicked off his campaign 
for the presidency in the aftermath of the protests in Baltimore over the death of a young 
black male in police custody. Had he gone there to make the announcement, as some 
younger members of the campaign staff favored, perhaps things might have been 
different. But he took the advice of his more experienced advisers and did not. In the end, 
Sanders won millions of votes, including a shocking upset in the Michigan primary, and 
swept through many western state caucuses like a prairie fire. But the Clinton campaign’s 
care and feeding of the Democratic Party Super-delegates, her control of the Democratic 
Party machinery, and the enormous advantages she started with proved just enough to 
secure her victory.  
 
14. Big Money and the Triumph of Trump 
 On May 3, Trump won the Indiana primary.  Senator Ted Cruz, one of his last 
two remaining opponents, dropped out of the race. The next day Ohio Governor John 
Kasich, whose campaign had won some support from portions of Wall Street (including 
some investors who had also supported Chris Christie) suspended his campaign. Trump’s 
nomination now appeared inevitable. Nevertheless, speculation and rumors about 
schemes to prevent his nomination by members of the Republican establishment ran rife 
in the media.  
 Well before then Trump had started enlarging his campaign entourage. In March, 
he had brought in Paul Manafort to bring order to the campaign’s pursuit of convention 
delegates (Sherman, 2016). A veteran Republican operative who had helped coordinate 
Ronald Reagan’s 1980 southern campaign strategy before becoming a lobbyist and 
adviser to a string of authoritarian leaders in the Philippines, Zaire, Angola, Somalia, and 
(as all the world now knows) Ukraine, Manafort began by trying to tone down some of 
Trump’s campaign rhetoric (Sturgis, 2017). As pressure intensified to conciliate as many 
Republicans as possible in order to rivet down the nomination and secure support in the 
general election, Manafort’s role widened. By mid-June, amid brutal infighting, he took 
over leadership of the campaign (Green, 2017).  
 As our Table 4 above showed, Trump had largely financed his primary campaign 
with small contributions and loans from himself. As late as mid-May, he remained 
convinced that his success in using free media and his practice of going over the head of 
the establishment press directly to voters via Twitter would make it unnecessary for him 
to raise the “$1 billion to $2 billion that modern presidential campaigns were thought to 
require” (Green, 2017). 
 As the convention approached, however, the reality of the crucial role of major 
investments in political parties started to sink in. Some of the pressure came from the 
Republican National Committee and related party committees. Their leaders intuitively  
grasped the point we demonstrated in a recent paper: that outcomes of most congressional 
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election races in every year for which we have the requisite data are direct (“linear”) 
functions of money (Ferguson et al., 2016).  The officials could safely project that the 
pattern would hold once again in the 2016 Congressional elections (as it did – see Figure 
3).56 But the Trump campaign, too, began to hold out the tin cup on its own behalf with 
increasing vehemence. As we noted earlier, small donations had been flowing steadily 
into its coffers. Unlike most previous Republican efforts, these added up to some serious 
money. But in the summer it became plain that the sums arriving were not nearly enough. 
In many senses, Trump was no Bernie Sanders. 
We have combined federal records from different sources to create a day-by-day 
picture of the Trump campaign’s incoming cash flow (including “outside money” 
supposedly uncoordinated with the campaign – see Figure 4). We are able to source the 
revenues to individual big businesses and investors and aggregate them by sector (Table 
6) and also by specific time intervals.  Our data reveal aspects of the campaign’s 
trajectory that have received almost no attention. It is apparent that Trump’s and 
Manafort’s efforts to conciliate the Republican establishment initially met with some real 
success. The run up to the Convention brought in substantial new money, including, for 
the first time, significant contributions from big business. Mining, especially coal mining;  
Big Pharma (which was certainly worried by tough talk from the Democrats, including 
Hillary Clinton, about regulating drug prices); tobacco, chemical companies, and oil 
(including substantial sums from executives at Chevron, Exxon, and many medium sized 
firms); and telecommunications (notably AT&T, which had a major merge merger 
pending) all weighed in.57  
Money from executives at the big banks also began streaming in, including Bank 
of America, J. P. Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo. Parts of Silicon 
Valley also started coming in from the cold. Contrary to many post-election press 
accounts, in the end contributions from major Silicon Valley firms or their executives 
would rank among Trump’s bigger sources of funds, though as a group in the aggregate 
Silicon Valley tilted heavily in favor of Clinton. Just ahead of the Republican convention, 
for example, at a moment when such donations were hotly debated, Facebook contributed 
$900,000 to the Cleveland Host Committee. In a harbinger of things to come, additional 
money came from firms and industries that appear to have been attracted by Trump’s talk 
of tariffs, including steel and companies making machinery of various types (Table 6).58 
The Trump campaign also appears to have struck some kind of arrangement with the 
Sinclair Broadcast Group, which owns more local TV stations than any other media 
concern in the country, for special access “in exchange for broadcasting Trump 
interviews without commentary (Anne, 2017).” 
 
 




 But our data and various press accounts also indicate that some important 
developments widely reported in the media took some time to mature. Many campaign 
accounts suggest that when Ted Cruz folded, the Mercers, Steve Bannon, and Kellyanne 
Conway went over to Trump, with whom Bannon had been intermittently working for a 
long time. This is just close enough to the truth to be potentially misleading. At the time, 
the Mercers were running an anti-Hillary Clinton Super Pac that had extended support to 
Ted Cruz, and Rebekah was having friendly discussions with the campaign and 
especially with the Trump family (Kushner and Ivanka Trump) (Gold, 2016). Robert 
Mercer made a large contribution to the anti-Hillary Super Pac, but few others did 
(Green, 2017).  
In 2015, the Trump campaign had rejected an overture from Cambridge 
Analytica, reportedly because it believed the firm charged too much (Vogel and 
Samuelsohn, 2016). In May, however, with Cruz out, negotiations to bring Cambridge 
Analytica into the campaign began again. After Steve Bannon introduced Alexander Nix, 
the head of the firm, to the Trump campaign people, Nix made another approach  
(Ballhaus and Bykowicz, 2017).  The evidence suggests that Cambridge was enthusiastic, 
but the Trump camp was divided. In early June, before any agreement had been reached, 
Cambridge sent a “small team” to work with the campaign’s Texas-based digital 
operation (Ballhaus and Bykowicz, 2017). Brad Parscale, a principal in the latter, served 
as Trump’s digital director.  Parscale reportedly favored striking an arrangement with 
Cambridge, but Paul Manafort did not (Vogel and Samuelsohn, 2016).  
 Nevertheless, as Politico reported “in GOP finance circles, hiring Cambridge 
Analytica is widely seen as a way to increase the likelihood of winning support from the 
Mercers” (Vogel and Samuelsohn, 2016). On June 13, Cambridge reportedly dispatched a 
contract to the campaign, which Nix and someone representing Cambridge signed on 
June 23 (Ballhaus and Bykowicz, 2017). At the end of June, with the gender makeup of 
Trump’s mostly male entourage clearly emerging as an issue, Conway came aboard as a 
campaign operative working under Manafort (Sullivan, 2016). 
 In the meantime, the process of reconciling with the rest of the party bogged 
down. By late July, the campaign’s cash inflows were plainly lagging behind the levels of 
Romney in 2012, Obama in 2008, or Hillary Clinton in 2016. Sheldon Adelson and many 
other donors who were reported in the press to be close to Trump or considering 
supporting him were not actually contributing or had contributed only modest amounts 
(e.g., Carl Icahn).  The Kochs were not enlisting, and never would. Contributions from 
defense and aerospace firms lagged well behind levels typical of past Republican 
presidential efforts. Describing the campaign’s financing as collapsing would be 
excessive; but it was not on track to deliver what was the campaign plainly would need. 
Some of the slow progress almost certainly traced to doubts among traditional 
Republican-inclined industries and investors put off by Trump’s continuing outbursts and 
friendly comments about Russia.  
The campaign eventually responded by launching another highly publicized push 
for funds from small donors, with promises of a match from Trump (Kaye, 2016). That 
brought in some money, but nothing like what was needed. (In the final weeks of the 
campaign, small contributions actually tailed off.) 
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 In mid-August, as Trump sank lower in the polls, the crisis came to a head. 
Rebekah Mercer had her fateful conversation with Trump at a fundraiser. Manafort, 
already under pressure from a string of reports about his ties with the Ukraine and Russia, 
was first demoted and then fired. Steve Bannon took over direction of the campaign and 
Kellyanne Conway was promoted to campaign manager (Green, 2017).  
 Bannon’s confidence that “If the left is focused on race and identity, and we go 
with economic nationalism, we can crush the Democrats” became famous only after the 
election (Kuttner, 2017). But within hours after Bannon and Conway took over, press 
accounts reported that “Bannon and Conway have decided to target five states and want 
to devote the campaign’s time and resources to those contests: Florida, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Ohio and Pennsylvania. It is in those states where they believe Trump’s appeal 
to working-class and economically frustrated voters has the best chance to resonate.” 
(Costa et al., 2016). Their strategy clearly evolved to embrace a few other states, but this 
retargeting had a vital counterpart on the financial side.  
The focus on the old industrial states attracted more money from steel, rubber, 
machinery, and other companies whose impulses to protection figured to benefit from 
this focus. But the bigger story over the next few weeks was the vast wave of new money 
that flowed into the campaign from some of America’s biggest businesses and most 
famous investors. Sheldon Adelson and many others in the casino industry delivered in 
grand style for its old colleague. Adelson now delivered more than $11 million in his own 
name, while his wife and other employees of his Las Vegas Sands casino gave another 
$20 million. Peter Theil contributed more than a million dollars, while large sums also 
rolled in from other parts of Silicon Valley, including almost two million dollars from 
executives at Microsoft and just over two million from executives at Cisco Systems.  
A wave of new money swept in from large private equity firms, the part of Wall 
Street which had long championed hostile takeovers as a way of disciplining what they 
mocked as bloated and inefficient “big business.” Virtual pariahs to main-line firms in the 
Business Roundtable and the rest of Wall Street, some of these figures had actually 
gotten their start working with Drexel Burnham Lambert and that firm’s dominant 
partner, Michael Milkin. Among those were Nelson Peltz and Carl Icahn (who had both 
contributed to Trump before, but now made much bigger new contributions). In the end, 
along with oil, chemicals, mining and a handful of other industries, large private equity 
firms would become one of the few segments of American business – and the only part of 
Wall Street – where support for Trump was truly heavy.59 
In the final weeks of the campaign, a giant wave of dark money flowed into the 
campaign. Because it was dark the identity of the donors is shrouded. But our scrutiny of 
past cases where court litigation brought to light the true contributors suggests that most 
of this money probably came from the same types of firms that show up in the published 
listings. In our data, the sudden influx of money from private equity and hedge funds 
clearly began with the Convention but turned into a torrent only after Bannon and 
Conway took over. We are interested to see that after the election some famous private 
equity managers who do not appear in the visible roster of campaign donors showed up 
prominently around the President. An educated guess on the sources of some of that 
mighty wave is thus not difficult to make, though the timing of the inflow from the big 
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private equity firms by itself is suggestive. In the end, total spending on behalf of Trump 
from all sources totaled about $1.2 billion, not much less than the Clinton campaign’s 
$1.4 billion (including Super Pacs, etc.). 
 
 15. The Failure of Clinton “Centrism”: American Trasformismo  
Most accounts treat the Clinton campaign after the Democratic Convention as a 
study in confusion and infighting. We do not doubt there was plenty of both (Allen and 
Parnes, 2017) (Brazile, 2017). But our data suggest other lines of analysis, too. In 
particular, if one looks at the Clinton campaign’s fundraising, it is immediately apparent 
that it was trying to run an American version of the famous “Trasformismo” system 
pioneered by a succession of center-right Italian politicians in the decades before World 
War I. The basic idea of that system was simple: put measured representatives of the left 
and right centers together against extremes, especially from the left.  
We have already observed that the reconciliation between establishment 
Republicans and Trump around Convention time was only partial. Holdouts and skeptics 
were abundant. They were especially prominent among Neoconservatives and traditional 
internationalists who were appalled by Trump’s talk of America First and his friendliness 
toward Russia. Many signed public letters and manifestos denouncing Trump, in some 
cases indicating they might be receptive to Clinton.  
 The Clinton campaign had been setting up an opening to the Neo-Conservatives 
and disenchanted Republicans for a long time (Karni, 2016). Throughout the campaign 
and in her post-election memoir, Clinton liked to portray herself to voters as continuing 
the legacy of President Obama. In foreign policy, this was something of a stretch. In fact 
she deliberately moved to the President’s right on major security and foreign policy 
issues. As the situation in Syria became more and more intense, the campaign let it be 
known that their candidate differed from Obama’s very careful stance against 
intervention. The possibility that substantial portions of the public might be tired of 
endless wars does not seem to have crossed anyone’s mind (Kriner and Shen, 2017).  
When Trump opened up on the Bush and Obama policies toward Iraq, Syria, 
Ukraine, Russia, and Afghanistan, Clinton’s move to the right in these areas persuaded 
many so-called “Neo-Conservatives” that they should seriously consider supporting her. 
Her stalwart defense of Wall Street, and doubts that Trump could be trusted with 
command of nuclear weapons, along with the universal conviction she was the likely 
winner, enhanced her attractiveness to these groups and to many other business interests 
that normally leaned Republican. As our Table 7 shows, Trump trailed well behind 
Clinton in contributions from defense and aerospace – a lack of support that we consider 
extraordinary for a Republican presidential hopeful this late in the race (compare with the 
corresponding table for Romney in (Ferguson et al., 2013).  
For Clinton’s campaign the temptation was irresistible: Over time it slipped into a 
variant of the strategy Lyndon Johnson pursued in 1964 in the face of another candidate 
who seemed too far out of the mainstream to win: Go for a grand coalition with most of 
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big business. Just as in 1964, this super-charged the campaign’s finances – a temptation 
that the Clintons could rarely resist. But in contrast to 1964, when Johnson ran as the 
candidate of peace and prosperity, the gambit carried with it unrecognized electoral risks 
that the Trump campaign ultimately exploited, not only in regard to economics, but in 
foreign policy as well (Kriner and Shen, 2017). And, as will become clearer below, one 
fateful consequence of trying to appeal to so many conservative business interests was 
strategic silence about most important matters of public policy. Given the candidate’s 
steady lead in the polls, there seemed to be no point to rocking the boat with any more 
policy pronouncements than necessary. When in the final days the campaign woke up to 
the fact that it was in the Twilight Zone, it was too late. 
The campaign also quietly maintained relatively hard lines on economic policy, 
which advisers signaled by their choice of models that suggested the US would soon 
return to full employment, and by the economists who were given major access. (Indeed, 
after arguing strenuously throughout the campaign that the Fed should not raise interest 
rates, many Democratic economists switched gears within days after the election and 
started beating drums in favor of rate rises.)  Misgivings of major contributors who 
worried that the Clinton campaign message lacked real attractions for ordinary 
Americans were rebuffed. The campaign sought to capitalize on the angst within business 
by vigorously courting the doubtful and undecideds there, not in the electorate. The result 
is evident in our Table 7, in which – with the possible exception of 1964 – the Clinton 
campaign looks like no other Democratic campaign since the New Deal. The Clinton 
campaign reached far into sectors and firms that have rarely supported any Democrat. 
The strong resemblance to the profile of the Romney campaign in 2012 in many (though 
not all) particulars is striking (see, again, Table 3, above and the industrial breakdowns 
presented in  (Ferguson et al., 2013). 
 
 
Table 7 About Here 
 
 
This monetary breadth came at a cost: The effort to reach out to big business had 
no hope of success if the candidate vigorously promoted policies along the lines Sanders 
had proposed. The evidence suggests that the campaign realized this: Though it 
constantly complained that the media ignored its policy proposals, it also talked less 
about policy than any other campaign for which we have measurements. Instead, it 
stressed candidate qualifications (Fowler et al., 2016). Even in the final days, it 
deliberately deemphasized issues in favor of concentrating on what the campaign 
regarded as Trump’s obvious personal weaknesses as a candidate. (Clinton, 2017).  
It was a miscalculation of historic proportions. The evidence suggests that Bannon 
and Conway were right. On election night, as Democratic hopes for control of the Senate 
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collapsed, the Clinton campaign fell victim to the American electoral counterpart of the 
Curse of Midas. In the electorate as a whole, the Trump campaign’s racism and misogyny 
appears to have cost it some votes. But just enough voters were turned off by years of 
economic stagnation and painful wars to allow Donald Trump – despite finishing behind 
Clinton in the popular vote –to slip into the White House (Ferguson and Page, 2017) 
(Monnat and Brown, 2017).  
 
16. Conclusion: The Political Economy of a Collapsing Party System 
 Business contributions to Donald Trump’s inaugural celebration broke all records. In 
contrast to his campaign which, as we have seen, stimulated truly substantial amounts of small 
contributions, the inaugural donations were on average gigantic. As Table 8 shows, 93% of them 
exceeded $100,000, with an average value of almost $406,000.60  
 
 
Table 8 About Here 
 
 
 It is too clever by half to dismiss these sums worthy of the Gilded Age as misplaced 
investments simply because of the slow pace of Congressional legislation. Trump and his allies 
do not need Congressional action to send rivers of cash flowing to many supporters. A wide 
range of executive actions and deliberate shifts of institutional priorities is already benefiting 
enormous numbers of them.  
 But our analysis of the political economy of the 2016 campaign points to sharp limits on 
what Trump or any other political force now operating can hope to achieve. The emergence of a 
full blown dual economy means that the system no longer works for many Americans. Spatial 
imbalances in economic growth, the declining welfare state, and insistent pressures to cut 
expenditures to lower taxes on the rich throw enormous stresses on average Americans. Many 
realize that their wages and working conditions are deteriorating, and that the challenges facing 
their children are intense.  
The result was the vast mobilizations against the establishments of both major parties that 
dominated the 2016 presidential struggle. Trump’s triumph came over the bitter opposition of 
older Republican elites; while the Clinton campaign had to pull out all the stops to contain the 
wave of protests from millions of ordinary Americans who actively supported an insurgent 
candidate running openly as a democratic socialist. In both parties, the new energy coming into 
the system from ordinary Americans is obvious. It fills many in power now with dread. 
 We are extremely skeptical that there is any way to put these genies back in the bottle. 
Very early in Trump’s tenure, he essentially lost control of most policy on national security and 
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was forced to make appointments that represented quite different points of view on policy toward 
Russia and, with some qualifications, China. Tensions between Trump and Republican 
Congressional leaders clearly run deep; their donor universes are strikingly different, as we will 
show on another occasion.  
Trump’s own coalition is extremely unstable. Our analysis of how it developed over time 
reveals that it is made up of several layers of investor blocs with little in common other than their 
intense dislike of existing forms of American government. The world of private equity, intent on 
gaining access to the gigantic, rapidly growing securities markets of China and the rest of Asia or 
casinos dependent on licenses for their lucrative businesses in Macau are likely to coexist only 
fitfully with American industries struggling to cope with world overcapacity in steel and other 
products or facing twenty-first century mercantilist state targeting.61 Substituting Mike Pence for 
Donald Trump would not change any of this nor would it end the all-out war on the GOP 
establishment that Bannon and his allies are waging. 
 Within the Democratic Party, the desires of party leaders who to continue to depend on 
big money from Wall Street, Silicon Valley, health insurers, and other power centers collides 
head on with the needs of average Americans Party leaders claim to defend. On medical care, 
minimum wages, unionization, and many other issues, there is no consensus; only intense 
wrangling behind a cloud of opaque rhetoric and increasingly hollow “resist” slogans. 
  Meanwhile big finance and the telecom giants intensify their pushes to be free of 
deregulation, while traditional patterns of alliances dissolve as the relative position of the U.S. in 
the global system alters. Trump’s triumph, with its powerful overtones of bait and switch, is a 
moment in the disintegration of a money-driven political system that is now appears trapped in a 
fatal circle of corruption and cynicism. 2016 showed that mass citizen involvement can 
dramatically reshape politics, but it also highlights the essential point of the investment approach 
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The Last-minute  Surge of Dark Money for Trump in 2016 
Far Exceeded That for Romney in 2012 
 

























The Simultaneous Late October Fall of Democratic Senate Hopes With Clinton Decline 
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Total!Amount! Clinton! Sanders! O’Malley! Webb!
<200"(UNITEMIZED)" 17" 59" 9.5" 42.5"
<="250" 2" 6" 2" 3.9"
2518499" 2" 6" .6" 1"
5008999" 3" 8" 4.9" 9"
100089999" 16" 16" 57.3" 39.5"
10000899999" 13" 2" 13.9" 4.1"





Total!Amount! Trump! Bush! Carson! Christie! Cruz!
<200"(UNITEMIZED)" 37.56" 1.7" 57" 1.6" 27"
<="250" 2.02" .1" 5" .3" 4"
2518499" 1.08" .1" 5" .2" 3"
5008999" 2.62" .6" 8" .8" 5"
100089999" 9.25" 19.8" 20" 26.1" 19"
10000899999" 6.88" 25.2" 3" 15.2" 7"
>=100000" 40.58" 52.5" 2" 55.8" 34"
 
Total!Amount! Fiorina! Gilmore! Graham! Huckabee! Jindal!
<200"(UNITEMIZED)" 27.2" .9" 2.8" 27.4" 2.3"
<="250" 2.4" .5" .4" 1.6" .3"
2518499" 1.8" .1" .4" 1" .1"
5008999" 4.8" 1.4" 1.8" 2.8" .5"
100089999" 17.9" 20.5" 33.2" 19.2" 21.1"
10000899999" 7.9" 29.4" 21" 2.9" 20.1"
>=100000" 37.9" 47.3" 40.5" 45.1" 55.6"
 
Total!Amount! Kasich! Pataki! Paul! Perry! Rubio!
<200"(UNITEMIZED)" 5.7" 1.5" 22.1" 3.1" 10.4"
<="250" 1" 1" 2.3" .6" .8"
2518499" .5" .1" 1.5" .1" 1.2"
5008999" 1.4" 1.3" 3.1" 1" 2.7"
 54 
100089999" 14.1" 27.5" 14.7" 28.8" 23.2"
10000899999" 8.2" 55.4" 9.1" 18.5" 6.2"










   
 
 
   




































Total!Amount! Trump!2016! Sanders!2016! Obama!2012! Romney!2012!
<200!(UNITEMIZED)! 38! 59! 37! 18!
<=!250! 2! 6! 2! 1!
251a499! 1! 6! 2! 1!
500a999! 3! 8! 3! 3!
1000a9999! 9! 16! 15! 17!
10000a99999! 7! 2! 21! 23!
















Industrial Structure and the GOP Race 
Industry (N) Trump 
% of firms 
Trump 
% of Money 
Bush 
% of firms 
Bush 
% of Money 
Carson 
% of firms 
Carson 
% of Money 
Christie 
% of firms 
Christie 
% of Money 
Mining (26) 8 0 15 85 12 1 0 0 
BB only (2) 50 0 100 90 50 0 0 0 
Coal Mining (147) 3 0 2 1 5 0 1 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accounting (275) 3 1 2 49 7 2 1 13 
BB only (3) 67 0 100 58 100 2 100 16 
Casinos (19) 16 0 37 29 5 0 26 28 
BB only (9) 22 0 56 32 11 0 44 27 
Service General (2346) 1 0 4 29 4 2 1 2 
BB only (57) 11 0 39 50 25 1 19 1 
Residential (16) 0 0 44 70 25 1 6 1 
Heavy Constr. (5488) 1 2 3 21 4 3 1 13 
BB only (9) 22 0 56 14 56 1 22 2 
Waste Mgt. (8) 13 3 13 14 13 4 0 0 
BB only (2) 50 4 50 19 50 6 0 0 
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Food (1668) 1 1 3 48 4 3 1 9 
BB only (34) 12 1 29 62 32 2 15 4 
Tobacco (15) 0 0 20 31 20 4 0 0 
BB only (3) 0 0 67 23 100 5 0 0 
Textiles (13) 8 0 0 0 23 8 0 0 
Apparel (23) 4 1 22 9 9 1 9 1 
BB only (5) 0 0 60 3 40 1 40 1 
Agribusiness (120) 1 0 3 13 3 1 1 0 
Paper (300) 2 0 6 27 8 1 2 1 
BB only (8) 25 0 50 6 63 1 0 0 
Printing and Pub (14) 21 2 21 67 21 2 0 0 
BB only (1) 100 2 100 92 100 0 0 0 
Chemical (695) 3 2 5 39 8 4 1 1 
BB only (16) 19 0 50 49 50 6 13 3 
Oil (3987) 2 0 5 41 6 1 1 3 
BB only (62) 23 0 56 44 39 1 6 2 
Rubber (318) 3 1 2 18 8 10 0 0 
BB only (1) 0 0 0 0 100 12 0 0 
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Industry (N) Trump 
% of firms 
Trump 
% of Money 
Bush 
% of firms 
Bush 
% of Money 
Carson 
% of firms 
Carson 
% of Money 
Christie 
% of firms 
Christie 
% of Money 
Glass (339) 2 0 1 62 6 16 1 4 
BB only (2) 0 0 100 97 0 0 50 3 
Steel (1214) 2 2 3 31 6 10 0 1 
BB only (6) 17 4 33 21 67 33 17 1 
Cosmetics (16) 0 0 31 17 13 0 6 0 
BB only (9) 0 0 44 19 22 0 11 0 
Altern Energy (22) 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electronics (121) 12 1 10 8 28 7 5 5 
BB only (13) 23 1 38 14 62 7 15 3 
Guns, Ammo (8) 13 7 13 15 25 11 0 0 
Machinery (222) 4 0 8 13 15 3 3 12 
BB only (14) 29 0 36 13 57 5 36 30 
Defense Prod and Serv (19) 0 0 11 7 11 3 5 1 
Autos (97) 7 1 6 27 19 14 2 7 
BB only (12) 17 1 25 36 42 14 8 2 
Aerospace (31) 19 1 26 14 32 11 16 2 
BB only (9) 67 1 78 14 89 11 56 2 
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Pharma (587) 3 2 6 20 8 3 3 31 
BB only (18) 28 1 61 28 56 4 22 5 
Computers (41) 20 1 27 20 32 4 15 35 
BB only (17) 24 1 41 21 29 3 18 38 
Internet Mfgr (17) 41 1 24 10 47 7 18 5 
BB only (2) 100 1 100 5 100 6 50 5 
Software (138) 15 0 19 6 22 1 9 2 
BB only (30) 20 0 30 4 27 0 17 0 
Telecom (1552) 2 0 4 11 5 1 2 2 
BB only (49) 20 0 43 9 29 0 20 1 
 
Industry (N) Trump 
% of firms 
Trump 
% of Money 
Bush 
% of firms 
Bush 
% of Money 
Carson 
% of firms 
Carson 
% of Money 
Christie 
% of firms 
Christie 
% of Money 
Beverages (38) 11 1 34 31 18 7 11 2 
BB only (5) 40 0 80 27 40 7 20 0 
Health (29951) 1 2 2 40 7 7 1 6 
BB only (18) 28 1 28 52 56 5 22 1 
Health Insur. (23) 30 0 48 48 52 5 26 5 
BB only (10) 50 1 100 48 90 5 60 6 
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Credit Reporting (10) 10 0 60 75 60 0 10 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 100 92 100 0 0 0 
Auto Dealers (3188) 1 0 3 6 2 1 0 1 
BB only (7) 0 0 43 0 29 0 0 0 
Transp, Trk, RR (1659) 2 1 3 45 5 3 0 0 
BB only (11) 36 0 36 75 45 2 0 0 
Airlines (14) 43 2 36 11 50 16 29 1 
BB only (4) 100 3 75 5 100 17 75 1 
Utilities (2582) 1 1 2 51 5 3 1 12 
BB only (19) 42 0 63 61 79 1 37 14 
Commun (14) 7 0 29 5 14 0 14 37 
BB only (5) 20 0 40 4 20 0 40 37 
Mortg and Non-Bk Lending (136) 1 0 11 18 8 0 3 49 
BB only (5) 0 0 60 1 40 0 20 64 
Real Estate (12451) 1 4 3 37 4 3 1 7 
BB only (36) 3 0 25 22 6 1 11 2 
Insurance (4927) 1 1 3 34 3 5 1 3 
BB only (35) 46 1 63 46 71 10 34 3 
Comm Banking (3971) 1 2 4 46 5 2 1 1 
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BB only (18) 56 3 72 49 50 1 50 1 
Invest and Hedge Funds (285) 4 1 21 11 4 0 5 8 
BB only (47) 9 2 40 15 6 0 15 14 
Priv Equity (14880) 1 1 7 33 3 1 1 8 
BB only (38) 3 0 21 22 3 0 5 1 
Brokers, Mut Fd (43) 21 0 28 53 33 2 12 4 
BB only (6) 33 0 67 91 33 2 17 0 
Retailing (195) 10 0 21 20 28 1 8 5 
BB only (68) 21 0 40 17 50 1 10 5 
100 Small Bus nec (512364) 1 2 1 27 3 4 0 6 
 
Industry (N) Cruz 










% of firms 
Gilmore 
% of Money 
Graham 




Mining (26) 35 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BB only (2) 50 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal Mining (147) 11 12 3 3 0 0 1 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accounting (275) 9 5 3 1 0 0 1 1 
BB only (3) 100 4 100 1 0 0 100 1 
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Casinos (19) 37 14 5 13 0 0 11 7 
BB only (9) 56 13 11 15 0 0 22 8 
Service General (2346) 8 4 2 1 0 0 1 0 
BB only (57) 26 3 16 0 0 0 12 1 
Residential (16) 44 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Heavy Constr. (5488) 8 25 1 2 0 0 0 2 
BB only (9) 56 76 33 1 0 0 22 3 
Waste Mgt. (8) 63 41 13 16 0 0 0 0 
BB only (2) 100 22 50 22 0 0 0 0 
Food (1668) 8 6 1 1 0 0 1 3 
BB only (34) 59 5 6 1 0 0 12 7 
Tobacco (15) 20 5 0 0 0 0 7 18 
BB only (3) 100 6 0 0 0 0 33 22 
Textiles (13) 15 7 0 0 0 0 15 47 
Apparel (23) 9 0 4 0 0 0 9 35 
BB only (5) 20 0 0 0 0 0 20 40 
Agribusiness (120) 3 4 2 1 0 0 2 15 
Paper (300) 13 3 2 0 0 0 1 21 
BB only (8) 50 1 25 0 0 0 13 30 
 63 
Printing and Pub (14) 36 7 14 1 0 0 0 0 
BB only (1) 100 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chemical (695) 15 11 2 1 0 0 1 4 
BB only (16) 63 7 25 2 0 0 19 16 
Oil (3987) 14 12 2 5 0 0 0 4 
BB only (62) 63 9 27 5 0 0 10 5 
Rubber (318) 14 27 3 11 0 0 0 1 
BB only (1) 100 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
              Industry (N) Cruz 
% of firms 
Cruz 
% of Money 
Fiorina 
% of firms 
Fiorina 
% of Money 
Gilmore 
% of firms 
Gilmore 
% of Money 
Graham 
% of firms 
Graham 
% of Money 
Glass (339) 11 7 2 1 0 0 1 1 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Steel (1214) 12 22 2 2 0 0 1 1 
BB only (6) 67 21 17 1 0 0 0 0 
Cosmetics (16) 31 18 25 19 0 0 0 0 
BB only (9) 56 21 33 21 0 0 0 0 
Altern Energy (22) 9 18 0 0 0 0 5 31 
Electronics (121) 53 26 13 6 0 0 4 10 
BB only (13) 85 23 23 1 0 0 15 25 
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Guns, Ammo (8) 25 19 13 0 0 0 0 0 
Machinery (222) 25 8 5 1 0 0 4 2 
BB only (14) 86 14 50 2 0 0 29 3 
Defense Prod and Serv (19) 16 26 0 0 0 0 11 34 
Autos (97) 34 27 6 1 0 0 3 2 
BB only (12) 58 26 17 1 0 0 17 3 
Aerospace (31) 45 27 26 3 3 0 29 16 
BB only (9) 89 27 67 3 11 0 67 16 
Pharma (587) 11 6 3 2 0 0 1 1 
BB only (18) 67 11 50 3 0 0 6 0 
Computres (41) 34 13 17 5 0 0 2 0 
BB only (17) 35 13 24 4 0 0 6 0 
Internet Mfgr (17) 71 18 24 2 0 0 6 13 
BB only (2) 100 14 100 3 0 0 50 17 
Software (138) 43 2 15 0 1 0 8 1 
BB only (30) 40 2 27 0 0 0 23 1 
Telecom (1552) 8 13 2 58 0 0 1 1 
BB only (49) 33 2 16 77 0 0 14 1 
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Industry (N) Cruz 
% of firms 
Cruz 
% of Money 
Fiorina 
% of firms 
Fiorina 
% of Money 
Gilmore 
% of firms 
Gilmore 
% of Money 
Graham 
% of firms 
Graham 
% of Money 
Beverages (38) 29 10 16 1 0 0 11 1 
BB only (5) 60 2 20 0 0 0 40 1 
Health (29951) 7 22 1 1 0 0 0 1 
BB only (18) 56 6 22 1 0 0 0 0 
Health Insur. (23) 70 13 26 2 4 0 17 4 
BB only (10) 100 11 40 2 10 0 40 4 
Credit Reporting (10) 70 3 30 2 0 0 20 0 
BB only (2) 100 1 100 2 0 0 50 0 
Auto Dealers (3188) 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BB only (7) 71 0 14 0 0 0 14 0 
Transp, Trk, RR (1659) 13 31 1 0 0 0 0 2 
BB only (11) 64 8 18 0 0 0 27 5 
Airlines (14) 71 42 43 4 0 0 0 0 
BB only (4) 100 45 100 4 0 0 0 0 
Utilities (2582) 10 8 1 0 0 1 1 4 
BB only (19) 95 2 42 0 11 1 37 3 
Commun (14) 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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BB only (5) 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mortg and Non-Bk Lending 
(136) 
10 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
BB only (5) 40 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 
Real Estate (12451) 6 11 1 3 0 0 0 1 
BB only (36) 6 1 8 2 0 0 8 1 
Insurance (4927) 7 17 1 2 0 0 0 1 
BB only (35) 86 10 43 1 3 0 17 1 
Comm Banking (3971) 7 18 2 1 0 0 0 1 
BB only (18) 67 3 61 1 6 0 33 1 
Invest and Hedge Funds (285) 9 35 4 0 0 0 2 0 
BB only (47) 9 0 4 0 2 0 6 0 
Priv Equity (14880) 5 8 2 5 0 0 1 2 
BB only (38) 0 0 3 52 0 0 8 16 
Brokers, Mut Fd (43) 23 5 26 1 0 0 9 2 
BB only (6) 17 0 67 1 0 0 33 0 
Retailing (195) 41 2 10 1 1 0 3 0 
BB only (68) 53 2 16 0 0 0 4 0 





















Industry (N) Huckabee 
% of firms 
Huckabee 
% of Money 
Jindal 
% of firms 
Jindal 
% of Money 
Kasich 
% of firms 
Kasich 
% of Money 
Pataki 
% of firms 
Pataki 
% of Money 
Mining (26) 0 0 4 2 8 0 0 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 50 2 0 0 0 0 
Coal Mining (147) 0 0 0 0 6 31 0 0 
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BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accounting (275) 1 0 0 0 3 15 0 0 
BB only (3) 33 0 0 0 100 5 33 0 
Casinos (19) 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 
BB only (9) 0 0 0 0 11 0 11 0 
Service General (2346) 1 0 0 6 3 22 0 0 
BB only (57) 12 0 4 4 18 1 2 0 
Residential (16) 0 0 0 0 13 23 0 0 
Heavy Constr. (5488) 0 1 0 0 1 18 0 1 
BB only (9) 33 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 
Waste Mgt. (8) 0 0 13 2 13 16 0 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 50 22 0 0 
Food (1668) 0 0 0 2 2 9 0 0 
BB only (34) 0 0 0 0 21 2 0 0 
Tobacco (15) 0 0 0 0 13 11 0 0 
BB only (3) 0 0 0 0 33 8 0 0 
Textiles (13) 0 0 0 0 8 37 0 0 
Apparel (23) 4 1 0 0 4 46 0 0 
BB only (5) 0 0 0 0 20 54 0 0 
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Agribusiness (120) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paper (300) 1 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 
BB only (8) 13 0 0 0 50 1 0 0 
Printing and Pub (14) 7 5 0 0 7 2 0 0 
BB only (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chemical (695) 0 0 1 5 5 21 0 0 
BB only (16) 13 0 0 0 31 4 0 0 
Oil (3987) 1 4 0 1 3 5 0 1 
BB only (62) 8 5 3 0 29 2 2 0 
Rubber (318) 1 2 0 1 4 15 0 0 
BB only (1) 100 2 0 0 100 45 0 0 
 
 
Industry (N) Huckabee 
% of firms 
Huckabee 
% of Money 
Jindal 
% of firms 
Jindal 
% of Money 
Kasich 
% of firms 
Kasich 
% of Money 
Pataki 
% of firms 
Pataki 
% of Money 
Glass (339) 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Steel (1214) 0 1 0 0 3 10 0 0 
BB only (6) 0 0 0 0 33 2 0 0 
Cosmetics (16) 0 0 6 0 25 1 6 7 
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BB only (9) 0 0 11 0 33 1 11 8 
Altern Energy (22) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electronics (121) 2 2 2 1 15 5 0 0 
BB only (13) 15 1 8 0 62 8 0 0 
Guns, Ammo (8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Machinery (222) 2 0 0 0 9 50 0 0 
BB only (14) 29 0 7 1 50 19 0 0 
Defense Prod and Serv (19) 5 6 5 6 5 1 0 0 
Autos (97) 2 3 0 0 5 5 1 1 
BB only (12) 0 0 0 0 33 8 0 0 
Aerospace (31) 19 1 6 0 32 7 0 0 
BB only (9) 56 0 22 0 78 7 0 0 
Pharma (587) 1 0 0 0 5 11 0 1 
BB only (18) 11 0 0 0 67 28 0 0 
Computres (41) 5 0 2 1 22 2 0 0 
BB only (17) 12 0 6 1 18 1 0 0 
Internet Mfgr (17) 6 0 0 0 35 29 0 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 100 34 0 0 
Software (138) 4 0 1 0 19 2 1 0 
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BB only (30) 13 0 3 0 27 0 0 0 
Telecom (1552) 1 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 
BB only (49) 6 0 2 0 29 3 4 0 
Beverages (38) 3 0 3 0 11 2 0 0 
BB only (5) 20 1 0 0 40 2 0 0 
Health (29951) 0 0 0 2 1 4 0 1 
BB only (18) 11 0 6 23 39 3 0 0 
Health Insur. (23) 13 0 9 1 39 8 9 4 






Industry (N) Huckabee 
% of firms 
Huckabee 
% of Money 
Jindal 
% of firms 
Jindal 
% of Money 
Kasich 
% of firms 
Kasich 
% of Money 
Pataki 
% of firms 
Pataki 
% of Money 
Credit Reporting (10) 0 0 0 0 50 15 0 0 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 100 1 0 0 
Auto Dealers (3188) 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 
BB only (7) 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 
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Transp, Trk, RR (1659) 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 
BB only (11) 18 1 0 0 36 2 0 0 
Airlines (14) 21 2 0 0 36 4 0 0 
BB only (4) 75 2 0 0 100 3 0 0 
Utilities (2582) 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 
BB only (19) 11 0 21 0 58 8 5 0 
Commun (14) 0 0 0 0 29 57 7 0 
BB only (5) 0 0 0 0 60 58 20 0 
Mortg and Non-Bk Lending 
(136) 
0 0 0 0 5 29 0 0 
BB only (5) 0 0 0 0 40 36 0 0 
Real Estate (12451) 1 1 0 1 2 10 0 1 
BB only (36) 3 0 0 0 17 32 3 3 
Insurance (4927) 1 1 0 4 2 16 0 0 
BB only (35) 23 1 6 8 54 4 3 0 
Comm Banking (3971) 1 0 0 0 3 7 0 0 
BB only (18) 22 0 11 0 61 7 11 0 
Invest and Hedge Funds (285) 1 0 1 1 10 15 0 0 
BB only (47) 2 0 0 0 15 24 2 0 
Priv Equity (14880) 0 0 0 1 3 17 0 0 
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BB only (38) 0 0 0 0 5 7 0 0 
Brokers, Mut Fd (43) 2 0 2 0 21 13 2 1 
BB only (6) 0 0 17 0 17 0 17 2 
Retailing (195) 2 0 3 1 18 58 1 0 
BB only (68) 4 0 7 1 35 62 0 0 
100 Small Bus nec (512364) 0 3 0 1 1 12 0 0 
 













% of firms 
Rubio 
% of Money 
Santorum 
% of firms 
Santorum 





% of Money 
Mining (26) 8 1 0 0 12 2 0 0 0 0 
BB only (2) 50 0 0 0 50 1 50 0 0 0 
Coal Mining (147) 5 0 1 1 7 46 1 0 1 4 
BB only (2) 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 
Accounting (275) 1 0 0 0 4 10 0 0 2 3 
BB only (3) 67 0 33 0 100 10 100 0 67 2 
Casinos (19) 21 0 0 0 21 2 0 0 16 6 
BB only (9) 22 0 0 0 22 1 89 0 11 3 
Service General (2346) 2 2 0 0 5 4 0 0 1 26 
BB only (57) 12 1 7 0 32 1 49 0 19 35 
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Residential (16) 25 0 6 1 50 3 0 0 6 1 
Heavy Constr. (5488) 1 1 0 2 3 7 0 0 1 2 
BB only (9) 56 1 11 0 56 2 67 0 22 0 
Waste Mgt. (8) 13 2 0 0 13 2 0 0 0 0 
BB only (2) 50 2 0 0 50 3 100 0 0 0 
Food (1668) 1 0 0 0 5 12 0 0 1 5 
BB only (34) 18 1 0 0 32 7 59 1 12 6 
Tobacco (15) 0 0 0 0 27 20 0 0 7 11 
BB only (3) 0 0 0 0 100 24 100 0 33 13 
Textiles (13) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Apparel (23) 9 0 0 0 26 5 0 0 0 0 
BB only (5) 20 0 0 0 40 1 60 0 0 0 
Agribusiness (120) 0 0 0 0 10 61 0 0 2 4 
Paper (300) 4 0 0 0 6 43 0 0 3 1 
BB only (8) 38 0 0 0 38 60 63 0 0 0 
Printing and Pub (14) 7 0 0 0 29 12 7 0 7 0 
BB only (1) 100 0 0 0 100 1 100 0 0 0 
Chemical (695) 3 3 0 2 7 6 0 0 3 2 
BB only (16) 6 0 0 0 56 11 69 0 25 2 
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Oil (3987) 2 1 1 12 6 7 0 0 2 3 

















% of firms 
Rubio 
% of Money 
Santorum 
% of firms 
Santorum 





% of Money 
Rubber (318) 2 3 0 0 5 11 0 0 1 1 
BB only (1) 100 3 0 0 100 11 100 0 100 11 
Glass (339) 2 2 0 0 4 5 0 0 1 0 
BB only (2) 50 0 0 0 50 0 50 0 0 0 
Steel (1214) 2 3 0 1 4 11 0 0 1 4 
BB only (6) 33 5 0 0 33 11 67 0 17 1 
Cosmetics (16) 13 0 0 0 19 37 0 0 6 0 
BB only (9) 22 0 0 0 22 30 56 0 11 0 
Altern Energy (22) 9 31 0 0 5 17 0 0 5 2 
Electronics (121) 13 3 2 0 21 20 2 0 4 5 
BB only (13) 46 7 8 0 31 7 85 1 15 1 
Guns, Ammo (8) 13 0 13 3 38 31 0 0 25 14 
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Machinery (222) 8 2 1 0 11 3 0 0 6 5 
BB only (14) 71 4 0 0 50 5 93 0 50 3 
Defense Prod and Serv (19) 11 3 0 0 21 13 5 1 0 0 
Autos (97) 9 4 0 0 9 5 1 1 3 1 
BB only (12) 33 4 0 0 33 5 67 0 8 0 
Aerospace (31) 35 4 0 0 39 10 6 0 19 3 
BB only (9) 89 4 0 0 78 9 89 0 56 3 
Pharma (587) 3 5 0 0 9 7 0 0 2 10 
BB only (18) 39 6 11 0 61 9 83 0 28 4 
Computres (41) 15 3 2 1 24 6 2 0 20 9 
BB only (17) 24 2 6 1 35 6 41 0 29 9 
Internet Mfgr (17) 47 5 6 3 41 5 0 0 18 2 
BB only (2) 100 4 50 4 100 7 100 0 50 0 
Software (138) 23 1 0 0 31 83 1 0 9 0 
BB only (30) 37 1 0 0 43 91 50 0 23 0 
Telecom (1552) 2 2 0 2 5 3 0 0 1 4 
BB only (49) 22 1 0 0 29 2 39 0 16 3 
Beverages (38) 16 4 3 0 32 38 3 0 16 2 
BB only (5) 40 1 0 0 60 59 60 0 20 1 
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Health (29951) 1 2 0 1 3 7 0 0 1 1 
BB only (18) 11 1 0 0 50 8 61 0 0 0 
 
 













% of firms 
Rubio 
% of Money 
Santorum 
% of firms 
Santorum 





% of Money 
Health Insur. (23) 39 1 9 0 57 7 9 1 22 1 
BB only (10) 70 2 20 0 80 8 100 2 30 1 
Credit Reporting (10) 40 1 0 0 50 4 0 0 20 1 
BB only (2) 100 0 0 0 100 3 100 0 50 0 
Auto Dealers (3188) 1 1 0 1 3 84 0 0 1 0 
BB only (7) 14 0 14 1 43 99 71 0 0 0 
Transp, Trk, RR (1659) 2 1 0 0 4 5 0 0 2 7 
BB only (11) 27 1 0 0 45 7 64 0 18 -1 
Airlines (14) 36 4 0 0 43 11 7 1 29 2 
BB only (4) 100 5 0 0 100 12 100 1 100 2 
Utilities (2582) 1 1 0 1 3 9 0 0 1 2 
BB only (19) 32 0 5 0 79 9 95 0 26 1 
Commun (14) 7 0 0 0 36 1 0 0 0 0 
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BB only (5) 0 0 0 0 60 1 40 0 0 0 
Mortg and Non-Bk Lending 
(136) 
2 0 1 0 10 1 0 0 4 0 
BB only (5) 0 0 0 0 60 0 100 0 20 0 
Real Estate (12451) 1 1 0 1 4 14 0 1 1 2 
BB only (36) 3 0 6 0 17 34 22 0 3 1 
Insurance (4927) 1 2 0 1 4 10 0 0 1 3 
BB only (35) 51 2 3 0 77 11 91 0 29 1 
Comm Banking (3971) 2 3 0 1 5 16 0 0 1 1 
BB only (18) 50 3 11 0 67 31 78 0 39 1 
Invest and Hedge Funds (285) 2 0 1 0 15 27 1 0 5 1 
BB only (47) 0 0 2 0 19 44 17 0 15 1 
Priv Equity (14880) 1 12 0 1 6 9 0 1 1 2 
BB only (38) 0 0 0 0 5 2 21 0 3 0 
Brokers, Mut Fd (43) 9 0 5 0 23 17 0 0 7 2 
BB only (6) 17 0 0 0 50 1 33 0 33 3 
Retailing (195) 15 4 1 0 26 5 1 0 9 2 
BB only (68) 28 5 0 0 38 5 62 0 21 1 








Industrial Structure of the Democratic Race 

















Mining)(26)) 31# 79# 27# 20# 0# 0# 4# 1#
BB)only)(2)) 100# 84# 50# 16# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Coal)Mining)(147)) 6# 68# 5# 18# 1# 14# 0# 0#
BB)only)(2)) 0# 0# 0# 0# 50# 100# 0# 0#
Accounting)(275)) 25# 96# 12# 4# 1# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(3)) 100# 96# 100# 4# 67# 0# 0# 0#
Casinos)(19)) 47# 93# 32# 5# 5# 2# 0# 0#
BB)only)(9)) 44# 94# 22# 3# 11# 2# 0# 0#
Service)General)(2346)) 33# 93# 22# 7# 1# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(56)) 46# 94# 30# 6# 5# 0# 2# 0#
Residential)(16)) 75# 99# 38# 1# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Heavy)Constr.)(5488)) 12# 93# 7# 6# 0# 1# 0# 0#
BB)only)(9)) 67# 95# 67# 5# 0# 0# 0# 0#
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Waste)Mgt.)(8)) 75# 68# 63# 32# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(2)) 100# 77# 100# 23# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Food)(1668)) 25# 93# 16# 7# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(34)) 62# 93# 56# 7# 6# 0# 0# 0#
Tobacco)(15)) 40# 98# 27# 2# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(3)) 100# 99# 67# 1# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Textiles)(13)) 31# 88# 23# 12# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(1)) 0# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Apparel)(23)) 91# 98# 65# 1# 9# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(5)) 100# 97# 40# 2# 20# 1# 0# 0#
Agribusiness)(120)) 10# 93# 3# 7# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(1)) 100# 100# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Paper)(300)) 24# 78# 22# 22# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(8)) 63# 78# 63# 22# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Printing)and)Pub)(14)) 71# 95# 50# 5# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(1)) 100# 83# 100# 17# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Chemical)(695)) 19# 93# 14# 6# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(16)) 63# 96# 56# 3# 13# 0# 0# 0#
Oil)(3987)) 20# 97# 10# 3# 0# 0# 0# 0#
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BB)only)(62)) 60# 95# 55# 5# 2# 0# 0# 0#
Rubber)(318)) 12# 72# 8# 18# 0# 10# 0# 0#
BB)only)(1)) 100# 81# 100# 19# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Glass)(339)) 18# 94# 19# 6# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(2)) 50# 99# 50# 1# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Steel)(1214)) 15# 91# 11# 8# 0# 0# 0# 1#
BB)only)(6)) 67# 87# 83# 13# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Cosmetics)(16)) 56# 96# 38# 4# 6# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(9)) 78# 95# 56# 4# 11# 0# 0# 0#
Altern)Energy)(22)) 50# 98# 23# 2# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Electronics)(121)) 79# 90# 62# 10# 4# 0# 1# 0#
BB)only)(13)) 92# 87# 85# 13# 15# 0# 0# 0#
Guns,)Ammo)(8)) 38# 92# 38# 8# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Machinery)(222)) 42# 85# 35# 14# 2# 1# 2# 0#
BB)only)(14)) 100# 86# 100# 12# 14# 2# 21# 0#
Defense)Prod)and)Serv)(19)) 21# 80# 26# 20# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Autos)(97)) 55# 89# 43# 11# 3# 0# 1# 0#
BB)only)(12)) 75# 81# 58# 18# 0# 0# 8# 0#
Aerospace)(31)) 58# 80# 45# 19# 16# 0# 10# 0#
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BB)only)(9)) 100# 80# 89# 19# 56# 1# 33# 0#
Pharma)(587)) 49# 94# 23# 6# 1# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(18)) 83# 94# 72# 6# 6# 0# 0# 0#
Computers)(41)) 63# 89# 51# 11# 2# 0# 2# 0#
BB)only)(17)) 59# 90# 41# 10# 6# 0# 6# 0#
Internet)Mfgr)(17)) 94# 88# 94# 12# 18# 0# 6# 0#
BB)only)(2)) 100# 91# 100# 9# 100# 0# 50# 0#
Software)(138)) 76# 90# 64# 10# 9# 0# 1# 0#
BB)only)(30)) 63# 90# 40# 10# 23# 0# 7# 0#
Telecom)(1552)) 30# 98# 17# 2# 1# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(49)) 63# 99# 37# 1# 14# 0# 8# 0#
Beverages)(38)) 53# 98# 37# 2# 3# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(5)) 80# 98# 60# 2# 20# 0# 0# 0#
Health)(29951)) 32# 91# 16# 9# 0# 1# 0# 0#
BB)only)(17)) 72# 99# 61# 1# 11# 0# 6# 0#
Health)Insur.)(23)) 83# 97# 78# 3# 17# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(10)) 100# 97# 100# 3# 40# 0# 0# 0#
Credit)Reporting)(10)) 80# 93# 70# 7# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(2)) 100# 95# 100# 5# 0# 0# 0# 0#
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BB)only)(1)) 100# 100# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Auto)Dealers)(3188)) 9# 92# 7# 7# 0# 1# 0# 0#
BB)only)(7)) 71# 84# 43# 15# 14# 1# 0# 0#
Transp,)Trk,)RR)(1659)) 13# 94# 9# 6# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(11)) 64# 81# 64# 19# 9# 0# 0# 0#
Airlines)(14)) 79# 85# 71# 13# 29# 2# 7# 0#
BB)only)(4)) 100# 86# 100# 13# 75# 1# 25# 0#
Utilities)(2582)) 12# 90# 12# 9# 0# 1# 0# 0#
BB)only)(19)) 95# 94# 89# 6# 5# 0# 11# 0#
Commun)(14)) 57# 94# 57# 4# 21# 1# 7# 0#
BB)only)(5)) 60# 93# 60# 5# 40# 2# 20# 0#
Mortg)and)Non[Bk)Lending)
(136))
33# 90# 18# 9# 1# 1# 1# 0#
BB)only)(5)) 80# 90# 60# 9# 20# 1# 20# 0#
Real)Estate)(12451)) 21# 98# 7# 1# 1# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(36)) 39# 100# 3# 0# 3# 0# 0# 0#
Insurance)(4927)) 15# 93# 7# 6# 0# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(35)) 91# 93# 89# 7# 11# 0# 0# 0#
Comm)Banking)(3971)) 20# 92# 9# 3# 1# 5# 0# 0#





36# 100# 7# 0# 2# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(47)) 45# 100# 9# 0# 6# 0# 0# 0#
Priv)Equity)(14880)) 29# 99# 7# 1# 1# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(38)) 42# 100# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0#
Brokers,)Mut)Fd)(43)) 63# 95# 49# 4# 7# 0# 2# 0#
BB)only)(6)) 50# 97# 33# 3# 17# 1# 0# 0#
Retailing)(195)) 69# 93# 58# 7# 3# 0# 0# 0#
BB)only)(68)) 75# 92# 62# 8# 6# 0# 0# 0#



































































Mining)(26)) 38! 277,462! 8! 0! 31! 96! 27! 4!
BB)only)(2)) 50! 268,133! 50! 0! 50! 98! 50! 2!
Coal)Mining)(147)) 37! 2,434,624! 3! 0! 25! 46! 22! 54!
BB)only)(2)) 100! 401,000! 0! 0! 0! 0! 100! 100!
Accounting)(275)) 21! 494,168! 3! 1! 15! 51! 15! 48!
BB)only)(3)) 100! 373,843! 67! 0! 100! 47! 100! 53!
Casinos)(19)) 68! 23,448,870! 16! 0! 26! 2! 68! 98!
BB)only)(9)) 89! 23,412,279! 22! 0! 33! 2! 89! 98!
Service)General)
(2346))
17! 11,628,129! 1! 0! 10! 48! 13! 52!
BB)only)(56)) 50! 10,139,577! 11! 0! 39! 48! 38! 52!
Residential)(16)) 56! 66,012! 0! 0! 44! 84! 56! 16!
Heavy)Constr.)
(5488))
25! 3,310,486! 1! 2! 12! 38! 19! 60!
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BB)only)(9)) 67! 67,209! 22! 5! 67! 33! 56! 62!
Waste)Mgt.)(8)) 50! 8,886! 13! 6! 50! 49! 50! 45!
BB)only)(2)) 100! 7,104! 50! 7! 100! 45! 100! 48!
Food)(1668)) 21! 1,330,344! 1! 1! 10! 32! 17! 67!
BB)only)(34)) 59! 176,956! 12! 2! 38! 68! 50! 30!
Tobacco)(15)) 27! 138,285! 0! 0! 20! 75! 27! 25!
BB)only)(3)) 100! 135,375! 0! 0! 100! 76! 100! 24!
Textiles)(13)) 23! 1,787! 8! 0! 23! 42! 23! 58!
Apparel)(23)) 35! 500,174! 4! 1! 26! 12! 26! 87!
BB)only)(5)) 60! 403,185! 0! 0! 40! 0! 60! 100!
Agribusiness)(120)) 11! 67,034! 1! 0! 5! 20! 9! 80!
Paper)(300)) 28! 213,282! 2! 1! 16! 36! 21! 63!
BB)only)(8)) 63! 39,575! 25! 3! 63! 28! 63! 69!
Printing)and)Pub)
(14))
43! 67,739! 21! 2! 29! 11! 29! 87!
BB)only)(1)) 100! 53,586! 100! 1! 100! 1! 100! 98!
Chemical)(695)) 31! 1,086,241! 3! 2! 17! 77! 25! 21!
BB)only)(16)) 69! 193,337! 19! 1! 56! 84! 56! 15!
91 
 
Oil)(3987)) 27! 6,835,437! 2! 1! 14! 47! 21! 52!
BB)only)(62)) 73! 2,779,747! 23! 0! 61! 58! 65! 42!
Rubber)(318)) 36! 343,720! 3! 1! 21! 65! 28! 34!
BB)only)(1)) 100! 152,701! 0! 0! 100! 99! 100! 1!
Glass)(339)) 26! 71,417! 2! 2! 16! 37! 18! 61!
BB)only)(2)) 50! 1,703! 0! 0! 50! 33! 50! 67!
Steel)(1214)) 35! 1,122,892! 2! 2! 20! 34! 26! 64!
BB)only)(6)) 67! 59,381! 17! 3! 67! 27! 67! 70!
Cosmetics)(16)) 44! 1,149,938! 0! 0! 31! 45! 44! 55!
BB)only)(9)) 56! 255,428! 0! 0! 44! 30! 56! 70!
Altern)Energy)(22)) 14! 12,125! 5! 2! 5! 1! 14! 97!
Electronics)(121)) 70! 853,526! 12! 1! 43! 14! 60! 85!
BB)only)(13)) 85! 481,568! 23! 1! 77! 9! 85! 90!
Guns,)Ammo)(8)) 38! 82,984! 13! 3! 25! 84! 25! 13!
Machinery)(222)) 39! 752,235! 4! 1! 26! 57! 36! 42!
BB)only)(14)) 93! 458,352! 29! 0! 71! 48! 93! 52!
Defense)Prod)and)
Serv)(19))
21! 6,370! 0! 0! 16! 24! 21! 76!
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Autos)(97)) 44! 915,507! 7! 0! 28! 17! 39! 83!
BB)only)(12)) 67! 768,004! 17! 0! 50! 5! 67! 95!
Aerospace)(31)) 58! 531,683! 19! 1! 52! 55! 55! 44!
BB)only)(9)) 89! 508,477! 67! 1! 89! 56! 89! 43!
Pharma)(587)) 22! 1,065,685! 3! 3! 14! 69! 18! 28!
BB)only)(18)) 83! 204,589! 28! 1! 72! 33! 83! 66!
Computers)(41)) 46! 292,480! 20! 2! 39! 51! 37! 47!
BB)only)(17)) 41! 235,760! 24! 1! 35! 57! 29! 42!
Internet)Mfgr)(17)) 76! 2,327,028! 41! 0! 76! 12! 65! 88!
BB)only)(2)) 100! 2,293,741! 100! 0! 100! 12! 100! 88!
Software)(138)) 57! 2,552,028! 15! 0! 43! 8! 51! 92!
BB)only)(30)) 50! 2,116,190! 20! 0! 43! 4! 47! 96!
Telecom)(1552)) 17! 5,874,713! 2! 0! 9! 30! 13! 70!
BB)only)(49)) 39! 4,400,873! 20! 0! 39! 31! 35! 69!
Beverages)(38)) 42! 263,306! 11! 2! 34! 53! 32! 45!
BB)only)(5)) 60! 139,553! 40! 0! 60! 49! 40! 51!
Health)(29951)) 16! 8,166,200! 1! 5! 8! 40! 13! 55!
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BB)only)(17)) 65! 527,131! 29! 1! 59! 93! 65! 6!
Health)Insur.)(23)) 78! 611,632! 30! 1! 61! 67! 78! 32!
BB)only)(10)) 100! 569,667! 50! 1! 100! 69! 100! 30!
Credit)Reporting)
(10))
70! 342,857! 10! 0! 60! 5! 60! 95!
BB)only)(2)) 100! 123,234! 0! 0! 100! 1! 100! 99!
Auto)Dealers)(3188)) 19! 1,908,866! 1! 1! 10! 22! 14! 77!
BB)only)(7)) 71! 3,665! 0! 0! 43! 41! 71! 59!
Transp,)Trk,)RR)
(1659))
26! 1,391,134! 2! 1! 13! 40! 19! 59!
BB)only)(11)) 64! 100,799! 36! 1! 55! 66! 64! 33!
Airlines)(14)) 71! 535,884! 43! 2! 57! 38! 71! 60!
BB)only)(4)) 100! 507,371! 100! 2! 100! 39! 100! 59!
Utilities)(2582)) 24! 845,433! 1! 2! 13! 48! 18! 50!
BB)only)(19)) 95! 153,660! 42! 3! 84! 51! 95! 46!
Commun)(14)) 21! 109,936! 7! 0! 21! 6! 21! 94!
BB)only)(5)) 40! 108,886! 20! 0! 40! 6! 40! 94!
Mortg)and)Non:Bk)
Lending)(136))
27! 262,872! 1! 1! 18! 74! 20! 25!
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BB)only)(5)) 100! 127,403! 0! 0! 60! 63! 80! 37!
Real)Estate)(12451)) 20! 10,680,447! 1! 4! 10! 39! 15! 57!
BB)only)(36)) 22! 1,021,894! 3! 0! 11! 29! 19! 71!
Insurance)(4927)) 18! 2,712,087! 1! 1! 10! 50! 13! 49!
BB)only)(35)) 91! 507,872! 46! 2! 86! 46! 89! 52!
Comm)Banking)
(3971))
16! 8,590,666! 1! 2! 10! 33! 12! 65!
BB)only)(18)) 78! 1,808,447! 56! 6! 72! 78! 67! 16!
Invest)and)Hedge)
Funds)(285))
17! 3,973,409! 4! 13! 11! 75! 13! 12!
BB)only)(47)) 17! 1,162,999! 9! 43! 13! 35! 9! 22!
Priv)Equity)(14880)) 15! 23,115,940! 1! 2! 8! 40! 11! 58!
BB)only)(38)) 21! 2,067,692! 3! 0! 18! 22! 11! 78!
Brokers,)Mut)Fd)(43)) 47! 321,117! 21! 1! 33! 82! 37! 17!
BB)only)(6)) 33! 225,164! 33! 1! 33! 96! 17! 3!
Retailing)(195)) 53! 1,515,087! 10! 1! 40! 34! 45! 65!
BB)only)(68)) 62! 807,657! 21! 1! 56! 49! 51! 50!
100)Small)Bus)nec)
(512364))












% OF MONEY 
TRUMP 
% OF FIRMS 
Mining%(26)% 30.77% 8.10% 38.46%
BB%only%(2)% 100.00% 4.16% 50.00%
Coal%Mining%(147)% 6.12% 0.74% 37.41**%
BB%only%(2)% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Accounting%(275)% 24.73% 80.39% 21.45%
BB%only%(3)% 100.00% 83.49% 100.00%
Casinos%(19)% 47.37% 0.54% 68.42*%
BB%only%(9)% 44.44% 0.45% 88.89*%
Service%General%(2346)% 32.65% 40.05% 16.62**%
BB%only%(56)% 46.43% 21.49% 50.00%
Residential%(16)% 75.00% 72.91% 56.25%
Heavy%Constr.%(5488)% 11.90% 46.66% 24.87**%
BB%only%(9)% 66.67% 91.89% 66.67%
Waste%Mgt.%(8)% 75.00% 66.54% 50.00%(.157)%
BB%only%(2)% 100.00% 66.11% 100.00%
Food%(1668)% 25.00% 56.42% 21.46*%
BB%only%(34)% 61.76% 68.89% 58.82%
Tobacco%(15)% 40.00% 52.57% 26.67(.157)%
BB%only%(3)% 100.00% 52.96% 100.00%
Textiles%(13)% 30.77% 83.05% 23.08%
Apparel%(23)% 91.30% 69.16% 34.78**%
BB%only%(5)% 100.00% 49.14% 60.00%
Agribusiness%(120)% 10.00% 31.33% 10.83%
BB%only%(1)% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Paper%(300)% 23.67% 42.86% 28.33(.194)%
BB%only%(8)% 62.50% 51.85% 62.50%
Printing%and%Pub%(14)% 71.43% 81.52% 42.86*%
BB%only%(1)% 100.00% 30.84% 100.00%
Chemical%(695)% 18.99% 52.21% 31.22**%
BB%only%(16)% 62.50% 81.54% 68.75%
Oil%(3987)% 19.71% 54.86% 27.09**%
BB%only%(62)% 59.68% 31.03% 72.58*%
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Rubber%(318)% 11.64% 14.09% 36.16**%
BB%only%(1)% 100.00% 5.24% 100.00%
Glass%(339)% 17.70% 88.36% 26.25**%
BB%only%(2)% 50.00% 99.58% 50.00%
Steel%(1214)% 14.74% 35.18% 35.01**%
BB%only%(6)% 66.67% 43.22% 66.67%
Cosmetics%(16)% 56.25% 24.54% 43.75%
BB%only%(9)% 77.78% 58.63% 55.56%
Altern%Energy%(22)% 50.00% 88.06% 13.64**%
Electronics%(121)% 78.51% 70.47% 70.25*%
BB%only%(13)% 92.31% 56.14% 84.62%
Guns,%Ammo%(8)% 37.50% 24.18% 37.50%
Machinery%(222)% 42.34% 50.61% 39.19%
BB%only%(14)% 100.00% 51.65% 92.86%
Defense%Prod%and%Serv%(19)% 21.05% 84.62% 21.05%
Autos%(97)% 54.64% 53.17% 44.33%
BB%only%(12)% 75.00% 30.80% 66.67%
Aerospace%(31)% 58.06% 69.22% 58.06%
BB%only%(9)% 100.00% 68.37% 88.89%
Pharma%(587)% 48.89% 74.57% 21.81**%
BB%only%(18)% 83.33% 89.57% 83.33%
Computers%(41)% 63.41% 90.98% 46.34(.071)%
BB%only%(17)% 58.82% 92.44% 41.18%
Internet%Mfgr%(17)% 94.12% 30.57% 76.47%(.180)%
BB%only%(2)% 100.00% 28.03% 100.00%
Software%(138)% 76.09% 80.86% 57.25**%
BB%only%(30)% 63.33% 79.60% 50.00%
Telecom%(1552)% 30.41% 87.64% 17.07**%
BB%only%(49)% 63.27% 88.50% 38.78**%
Beverages%(38)% 52.63% 84.03% 42.11%
BB%only%(5)% 80.00% 84.35% 60.00%
Health%(29951)% 31.67% 80.61% 16.17**%
BB%only%(17)% 76.47% 93.45% 64.71%
Health%Insur.%(23)% 82.61% 91.20% 78.26%
BB%only%(10)% 100.00% 91.48% 100.00%
Credit%Reporting%(10)% 80.00% 50.43% 70.00%
BB%only%(2)% 100.00% 63.92% 100.00%
BB%only%(1)% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Auto%Dealers%(3188)% 9.22% 31.91% 19.04**%
BB%only%(7)% 71.43% 84.54% 71.43%
Transp,%Trk,%RR%(1659)% 12.90% 57.23% 25.86**%
BB%only%(11)% 63.64% 59.95% 63.64%
Airlines%(14)% 78.57% 66.20% 71.43%
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BB%only%(4)% 100.00% 66.15% 100.00%
Utilities%(2582)% 11.89% 71.64% 24.36**%
BB%only%(19)% 94.74% 90.40% 94.74%
Commun%(14)% 57.14% 85.96% 21.43*%
BB%only%(5)% 60.00% 82.27% 40.00%
Mortg%and%NonZBk%Lending%
(136)% 33.09% 55.18% 27.21%
BB%only%(5)% 80.00% 62.92% 100.00%
Real%Estate%(12451)% 20.87% 78.57% 19.97%(.090)%
BB%only%(36)% 38.89% 95.66% 22.22(.180)%
Insurance%(4927)% 15.06% 64.79% 18.25%
BB%only%(35)% 91.43% 83.48% 91.43%
Comm%Banking%(3971)% 20.02% 56.03% 16.17**%
BB%only%(18)% 72.22% 77.70% 77.78%
Invest%and%Hedge%Funds%(285)% 36.14% 90.92% 17.19**%
BB%only%(47)% 44.68% 96.61% 17.02**%
Priv%Equity%(14880)% 28.74% 77.87% 15.43**%
BB%only%(38)% 42.11% 53.69% 21.05%(.074)%
Brokers,%Mut%Fd%(43)% 62.79% 78.60% 46.51*%
BB%only%(6)% 50.00% 65.45% 33.33%
Retailing%(195)% 69.23% 81.26% 53.338*%
BB%only%(68)% 75.00% 86.44% 61.76*%












                         AMOUNT      PERCENT OF TOTAL 
UNITEMIZED  .6 
 <= $250   .02 
251-499   .05 
500-999   .03 
1,000-9,999   .36 
10,000-99,9999  5.76 
>=100,000   93.17 
 
The average of those gifts totaling $100,000 or more is $405,841. 
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the University of Texas Inequality Project: http://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/papers/utip_32.pdf  
49 See the discussion in GELMAN, A. 2016. 19 Things We Learned From the 2016 Election. Statistical Modeling, 
Causal Inference, and Social Science, December 8, 2016. 
50 Thereafter we count money coming in for Trump as part of the general election; we also use that date as the cutoff 
point for beginning to count money to the Republican National Committee as money for Trump, parallel to our 
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treatment of Obama and other presidential nominees in earlier years. Note that other reports of money in the election 
count all donations to anti-Clinton Super Pacs as pro-Trump. We do not until after this May date. 
The relations between the Trump campaign and the RNC were the subject of many news articles, but it is clear that 
they in fact worked together quite closely. We count all money given to the Democratic National Committee as a 
contribution to the Clinton campaign; it was obvious from leaked emails long before Donna Brazile revealed details 
of the secret agreements between the DNC and the Clinton campaign that the latter controlled the committee. 
BRAZILE, D. 2017. Hacks, New York, Hachette. 
51 Note that when we speak of money coming from particular firms, unless otherwise indicated, we are using 
shorthand for an amalgamation of money from different sources: the executives of the firms who mostly donate in 
their own names, funds directly paid out by corporations (which do not go directly into campaign committees, but to 
nominally independent committees promoting candidates), contributions from firm political action committees, etc. 
The usage does not normally imply that contributions came in the name of the firm. See the discussion in 
FERGUSON, T., JORGENSEN, P. & CHEN, J. 2013. Party Compeititon and Industrial Structure in the 2012 
Elections: . International Journal of Political Economy, 42, 3-41. And FERGUSON, T. 1995a. Golden Rule: The 
Investment Theory Of Party Competition And The Logic  Of Money-Driven Political Systems, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Those two sources also outline our system for making industrial sector assignments, which we carry over in this 
paper. Identifying firms below our cut offs for big business is inevitably tricky, because finding sectoral data 
becomes very difficult. When that is unavailable, some sectors, notably oil or steel, provide many clues in the names 
of many firms. But not all sectors do. It is inevitable that errors and omissions creep into the small firm statistics; for 
big firms, the problems are different. In those, the data is much easier to find, but sometimes can mislead. 
52 For the differences within the telecom sector in regard to network neutrality, see the discussion and references in 
FERGUSON, T., JORGENSEN, P. & CHEN, J. 2017. Fifty Shades of Green: High Finance, Political Money, and 
the US Congress. New York: Roosevelt Institute. 
53 The local rescinded the invitation at the last minute under pressure from the national union. Trump came anyway 
and was welcomed by the local members. See the discussion in GREEN, J. 2017. Devil's Bargain -- Steve Bannon, 
Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency, New York, Penguin. 
54 PATTERSON, T. 2016b. Pre-Primary News Coverage of the 2016 Race: Trump's Rise, Sanders' Emergence, 
Clinton's Struggle. Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics, and Public Policy, June 13, 2016, dismisses complaints 
about the media’s coverage of Sanders, though conceding he was initially ignored. We think this is a mistake and 
that the study should have directly compared the treatment of Trump by the media with Sanders and looked more 
closely at the tone than the study did. Compare the many quantitative assessments of coverage on the website of 
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting; for example, JOHNSON, A. 2016. Washington Post Ran 16 Negative Stories 
on Bernie Sanders in 16 Hours. FAIR.org, March 8, 2016. 
55 Total union contributions to Clinton before August 1, 2016 amounted to just under $34 million dollars; total union 
contributions to Sanders totaled just over $5.4 million. The number of individual union members contributing we 
can identify to each campaign is almost the same, running close to 450,000 for both. But there are many more 
organizational and political action contributions to the Clinton campaign from labor sources. 
56 Note that as we have stressed many times, two way causality between money and votes happens. But as we 
argued in detail in FERGUSON, T., JORGENSEN, P. & CHEN, J. 2016. How Money Drives US Congressional 
Elections. Institute for New Economic Thinking, Working Paper #48, money typically is the more important factor. 
The 2016 Senate results are an especially striking case in point, since the wave of Republican money that preserved 
the Senate came when their polls were strikingly unpromising. More of this in another paper. 
57 We repeat our caution above that mentioning firms is usually a shorthand for summarizing a wide variety of 
contributions, including from individual executives, not firms per se. The big Facebook contribution is something of 
a surprise, given the wave of publicity that insists that the firm was lopsidedly partial to Democrats. But we cannot 
explore this question here. It also came in the name of the firm. 
58 We have several times received queries about whether foreign money could be mixed into these numbers. Various 
unconfirmed reports swirling around also raise this question in a pointed fashion. See, e.g., LEOPOLD, J., 
CORMIER, A. & GARRISON, J. 2017. Secret Finding: 60 Russian Payments "To Finance Election Campaign of 
2016". BuzzFeed, November 14, 2017. We have run the obvious checks for eastern European names of people and 
companies, with no interesting results. Essentially all the very large transactions are relatively easy to trace and do 
not raise questions. An organized effort to channel many small contributions is possible, but there is no real way to 
rule something like that out.  But our view is that to add appreciably to the fantastic sums clearly raised 
domestically, any such effort would have to so large it probably would surface. The sums bandied around 
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speculatively in various news reports simply wouldn’t make a real difference. The U.S. political system is money-
driven and needs no foreign intervention to reach that status. 
One caution on Figure 4; one giant contribution in mid-June distorts it, even though we use a three day moving 
average. See the discussion in TRUDO, H. and VOGEL, K., 2016. Convicted Ponzi Schemer: I’ll Conduct $50 
Million Marketing Campaign for Trump. Politico, June 16, 2016; this appears to have been carried out. 
59 See the discussion above on the relative reliability of the data on private equity; the point is that the big business 
data is likely quite good. 
60 The sources for this table are more complex than they should be. The Federal Election Commission, as this paper 
concludes, has a Committee ID number for a “58th Presidential Inaugural Committee.” That ID isC00629584, but 
that takes you to a notice that there is as yet no data. There was at one time a pdf of the donors available, though not 
the electronic file that would be normal. We are not sure that the pdf is still available, but earlier we did acquire a 
copy and have used it for our tabulations along with the list compiled (presumably from that pdf) at Open Secrets: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1MgxCjiw0niZxuSlfUEqbHpiLhrSL97XYOisgTzYbmVc/edit#gid=899971
993 
We also consulted the crowd sourced compilation that Huffington Post organized; see FARENTHOLD, D. A. 2017. 
After Crowdsourced Investigation, Trump Inaugural Committee Admits There Were Errors in Its Donor List. 
Washington Post, April 25, 2017. This pointed to a series of names that were rather plainly fake. 
61 Which the American state also pursues heavily in various sectors; see the earlier discussion of state investment in 
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and others, above. 
